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Damned If They Do, Damned If They Don't: The
Need for a Comprehensive Public Policy to Address
the Inadequate Management of Pain
Amy J. Dilcher*
"Doctors feel damned if they do and damned if they don't .... The

enormous confusion about pain has led to the hysteria around opiates.

'

I. INTRODUCTION

I am dying in sustaining such a devouring pain. -Sophocles
Throughout history and across cultures, human beings have experienced
pain. As early as the fifth century B.C., Sophocles documented the
experience of pain and suffering in Philoctetes. Centuries later, the
undertreatment of pain in the United States is a public health epidemic
2
despite the availability of treatment for relieving most physical pain. The
* Amy J.Dilcher, Health Law LL.M., University of Houston Law Center (2002); J.D.,
Howard University School of Law (1999); B.S.N., University of Pittsburgh (1995). Health
Care Associate, Proskauer Rose, LLP (2000 to present). I would like to thank Professors
William J.Winslade and Joan H. Krause from the University of Houston Law Center for
their time, guidance, and suggestions regarding early drafts of this paper. Thanks to my
family for their love and support. Thanks to Joe Casson and Mal Harkins, partners at
Proskauer Rose, for the opportunities and experiences that I have had as an associate as well
as the encouragement to complete this article. Thanks to Richard Basile, a former colleague,
for helpful advice, and to the editors and staff of the Annals of Health Law for doing on my
behalf what they do so well.
1. Statement of Dr. Scott Fishman, Chief of the Division of Pain Medicine at the
University of California at Davis Medical Center, regarding Bergman v. Eden Med Ctr., No.
H205732-1 (Alameda County Ct. filed June 13, 2000), the first case in which a physician
was held liable for elder abuse for undertreating a patient's pain.
2. Michael J.Reynolds, Note, Morphine or Malpractice: Should Courts Recognize a
Legal Duty to Prescribe Opiatesfor Treating Chronic Pain, 15 ST. JOHN'S L. COMMENT 79,
79 (2000). See also Darlene Fujimoto, Regulatory Issues in Pain Management, 17 CLINICS
INGERIATRIC MED. 537, 537 (2001) (identifying inadequate pain assessment and treatment

as a "significant public health problem in elderly patients, even in those suffering from
cancer pain"); D.E. JORANSON ET AL., PAIN & POLICY STUDIES GROUP, UNIV. OF WIS.

POLICY: A
COMPREHENSIVE CANCER CTR., ACHIEVING BALANCE IN FEDERAL AND STATE PAIN

GUIDE TO EVALUATION i (July 2000) ("It is well understood that inadequate management of

pain

is a serious

health problem
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prevalence of undertreated moderate to severe pain is a persistent problem
that affects more than fifty million Americans, including individuals with
chronic non-malignant conditions and terminal illnesses.3 The inadequate
management of pain costs the United States as much as $100 billion per
year in health care expenditures, disability payments, and lost productivity.4

Narcotics in the morphine class, known as opioids, are safe and effective
in the treatment and management of pain.5 However, for opioids to be truly
useful, they must be legally and practically accessible to medical
professionals and their patients as and when needed to provide satisfactory
relief from pain. 6 Liberalizing the use of opioids would benefit a significant

number of patients suffering from acute and chronic pain; indeed, the
Agency for Healthcare Policy and Research, part of the Department of

Health and Human Services, found that a full eighty percent (or more) of
cancer patients could have their pain successfully managed by a
combination of opioids and other analgesic drugs and that only ten percent
of such patients experienced pain so profound as to be impervious to any
7
sort of analgesic treatment.
This article synthesizes a number of perspectives regarding the
www.medsch.wisc.edu/painpolicy; Press Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), DEA to Join Pain Advocates in Issuing Statement on Prescription Pain Medications
(Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/pubs/pressre/pr102301.html.
3.
Reynolds, supra note 2, at 79.
4. Melanie Thernstrom, Pain, The Disease,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, § 6 (Magazine),
at 66 (estimating total costs of chronic pain add up to more than $100 billion annually);
Reynolds, supra note 2, at 79 (estimating that the costs of chronic pain total "over $70
billion per year in health care spending and lost productivity"); Press Release, American
Pain Society, American Pain Society Urges Congress to Preserve Patient Access to Pain
Medications (Dec. 11, 2001), at www.ampainsoc.org/whatsnew/121101.html ("Pain is one
of the most common reasons people consult a physician, yet it frequently is inadequately
treated, leading to enormous social cost in the form of needless suffering, lost productivity,
and excessive health care expenditures.").
5.
JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 3; Reynolds, supra note 2, at 80; Fujimoto, supra
note 2, at 537. For the purposes of this article, the term "narcotic" is synonymous with the
terms "opioid," "pain medication," "controlled substance," and "morphine."
6. Fujimoto, supra note 2, at 537 (arguing that widespread perception that regulatory
policies prohibit use of opioids to treat pain is a significant factor causing prescribers to
inadequately relieve cancer pain and to undertreat or refuse to prescribe opioids for chronic
pain).
7. Vincent Perron & Ronald S. Schonwetter, Assessment and Management of Pain in
Palliative Care Patients, 8 CANCER CONTROL 15, 18 (2001) (noting that around the clock
dosing, using other forms of treatment in addition to pain medication, and using noninvasive
routes of administration provide good pain control for eighty percent of patients). See also
Michael H. Levy, PharmacologicTreatment of Cancer Pain, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1124,
1127 (1996) ("Analgesic drugs should be scheduled at intervals that prevent the recurrence
of pain and minimize the number of daily doses."). Analgesia means the absence of pain
without a loss of consciousness. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE STEADMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY (27th ed. 2000).
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comprehensive regulation of pain management and demonstrates that the
inadequate treatment of pain results from a multitude of barriers, which
includes government pain policies, enforcement actions, attitudes,
inadequate education, and reimbursement policies. Part II of this article
examines each of the components that contribute to the inadequate
management of pain and recent cases involving the undertreatment of pain.
To date, efforts to improve pain management have been piecemeal and
hence incomplete. Part III argues that the only way to adequately address
the pain epidemic in this country is through a comprehensive public policy
that addresses all of the barriers to pain management. Part III further
examines legislation proposed in the 108th Congressional session, the
Conquering Pain Act of 2003 ("Act" or "CPA"). The CPA, while a
noteworthy effort on the part of Congress to promote more effective pain
management, fails to adequately address some of the most serious problems
facing doctors and other front-line practitioners, notably the fear of
regulatory scrutiny.
Part IV offers recommendations for a more comprehensive policy - one
that would enhance the management of pain through the use of controlled
substances. The CPA should be amended to address problems with federal
and state investigations and enforcement actions of controlled substance
laws, to require health care providers and facilities to assess pain, to change
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement policies that impact the
management of pain, and to improve the education of health care providers
about the use of controlled substances to manage pain.
II. INADEQUATE PAIN MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The undertreatment of pain in the United States is well-documented in
scientific literature. Almost thirty years ago, Dr. Richard Marks and Dr.
Edward Sachar researched the inadequate management of pain in the
hospital setting.8 Based on structured interviews and chart reviews of
thirty-seven inpatients hospitalized at Montefiore Hospital and Medical
Center in New York, 32% of the patients exhibited ongoing severe distress
9
from pain despite receiving narcotic treatment. The physicians also noted
that 41% of the subjects remained in moderate stress from pain, and 27% of
the subjects complained of minimal distress from pain, even though both
groups received pain medication. ° From this data, the authors concluded
that there "was clearly a general pattern of undertreatment of pain with
8.

Richard M. Marks & Edward J. Sachar, Undertreatment of Medical Inpatients with

Narcotic Analgesics, 78 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 173, 173 (1973).

9. Id. at 175.
10. Id.
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narcotic analgesics, leading to widespread and significant patient
distress."'"
Recent studies demonstrate that the inadequate management of pain
remains a problem in the United States. These studies have demonstrated
continued inadequacies in treatment (1) of those patient populations most
likely to suffer from chronic and acute pain, including terminally ill

15
14
patients, 12 cancer patients, 13 nursing home residents, elderly individuals,

and chronic pain patients,16 and (2) in those medical environments where
acute pain is routine, such as the emergency room,' 7 the post-operative
unit,' 8 and the intensive care unit.' 9
In a 1994 study of 1308 outpatients with metastatic cancer, more than
two-thirds exhibited pain.20 While most of the patients who complained of
pain received some type of alleviative treatment, 36% reported that their
pain was severe enough to impair their ability function, affecting their
enjoyment of life, level of activity, ability to walk, sleep, and work, and
11.

Id. at 176.

12. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., The Practiceof Euthanasiaand PhysicianAssisted Suicide
in the United States, 280 JAMA 507, 510 (1998); SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A
Controlled Trial to Improve Carefor Seriously Ill HospitalizedPatients, 274 JAMA 1591,

1595 (1995).
13. Charles S. Cleeland et al., 330 NEwENG. J. MED. 592, 592 (1994) (noting that fortytwo percent of outpatients with recurrent or metastatic cancer with complaints of pain were
not provided with adequate pain relief). See also Levy, supra note 7, at 1124.
14. Wendy M. Stein, Pain in the Nursing Home, 17 CLINICS IN GERIATRIC MED. 575,
576 (2001) (estimating the prevalence of pain in nursing home residents ranges from fortyfive to eighty percent). See also Brian A. Ferrell et al., Pain in the Nursing Home, 38 J. AM.
GERIATRIC Soc'y 409, 411 (1990) (concluding that as many as eighty percent of nursing
home residents experience pain).
15. Brian A. Ferrell, Pain Management in Elderly People, 29 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y
64, 64 (1991) (revealing that twenty-five to fifty percent of elders living in the community
reported complaints of pain).
16. See generally Myra Glajchen, Chronic Pain: Treatment Barriersand Strategiesfor
Clinical Practice,14 J. Am. BD. OF FAM. PRAC. 211 (2001).
17. Paula Tanabe & MaryBeth Buschmann, Emergency Nurses' Knowledge of Pain
Management Principles,26 J. EMERGENCY NURSING 299, 299 (2000) (noting that seventyeight percent of all patients that arrived at the emergency department presented with pain as
an initial symptom).
18. Harry Owen et al., Post-operativePain Therapy: A Survey of Patients' Expectations
and Their Experiences, 41 PAIN 303, 305 (1990). See also Bemardo Ng et al., Ethnic
Differences in Analgesic Consumption for PostoperativePain, 58 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED.
125, 128 (1996).
19. Ben A. Rich, An Ethical Analysis of the Barriers to Effective Pain Management, 9
CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 54, 54 (2000) (noting fifty percent of intensive care
unit patients suffered from moderate to severe pain during the last days of life, citing
SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill
HospitalizedPatients,274 JAMA 1591, 1591-98 (1995)).
20. Cleeland et al., supra note 13, at 592.
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relations with others. 21 The study determined that 42% of the outpatients
who exhibited pain were not provided with adequate pain relief.22 The
inadequate treatment of pain described in the study has many causes, each
creating a separate barrier to pain management.
A. Fearof Regulatory Scrutiny as a Barrierto PainManagement
One of the primary barriers to pain management is fear of regulatory
scrutiny. 23 A 1991 survey of ninety Wisconsin physicians revealed that,
due to fears of regulatory inquiry, the majority of physicians (54%)
prescribed fewer doses and lesser quantities of pain medication, allowed
24
fewer refills, or selected a different drug than they otherwise would have.
In that same year, 40% of physician members of the American Pain Society
reported that concerns about regulatory scrutiny, rather than medical
considerations, led physicians to "avoid prescribing opioids for chronic
non-cancer pain patients. 2 5
The problem is no better today. A 2001 California survey showed that
40% of primary care physicians reported that fear of investigation tempered
their use of opioids for patients with chronic non-malignant pain out of fear
of investigation. 26 As a consequence of self-protective medical restraint,
patients may be suffering needlessly simply because the regulatory
environment is unfriendly to aggressive pain management.
1. Federal Law
For centuries, the medical profession has utilized opium (from which
morphine is derived) to treat pain. 27 Despite the historical use of narcotics,
opioids did not become a target of federal regulation in the United States

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. David E. Joranson & Aaron M. Gilson, State Intractable Pain Policy: Current
Status, AM. PAN SOC'Y BULL., March/April 1997, at http://www.ampainsoc.org/pub/
bulletin/mar97/policy.htm.
24. David E. Weissman et al., Wisconsin Physicians' Knowledge and Attitudes About
OpioidAnalgesic Regulations, 90 Wis. MED. J. 671, 671 (1991), at www.medsch.wisc.edu/
painpolicy/publicat/91 wmj.htm.
25. David E. Joranson et al., Pain Management, Controlled Substances, and State
Medical Board Policy: A Decade of Change, 23 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 138, 139
(2002) (describing a 1990 survey of oncologists in which eighteen percent of the respondents
reported excessive regulation of opioids as one of the top four barriers to pain management).
26. Michael Potter et al., Opioids for Chronic Nonmalignant Pain: Attitudes and
Practices of Primary Care Physicians in the UCSF/Stanford Collaborative Research
Network, 50 J. FAM. PRAC. 145, 148 (2001).
27. ROSELYNE REY, THE HISTORY OF PAIN 42-43 (Louise Elliot Wallace et al., trans.,
Harvard University Press ed. 1995).
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until the early 1900s. The first attempt to regulate the distribution and
marketing of narcotics was the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.28 In 1914,
Congress twice attempted to regulate narcotics with the Harrison Act 29 and
the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act.3° In 1970, Congress repealed
both of these laws and enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act, of which Title II is known as the Controlled Substances
Act ("CSA"). 31
In addition to the CSA, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA") 32 regulates the overall distribution or delivery of drugs. 33 The
FDCA requires that the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approve
every new drug introduced into interstate commerce.34 The FDA has
approved the use of many controlled substances as safe and effective under
the FDCA.35
The FDA requires that all approved controlled substances be dispensed
to patients only by prescription.36 Upon FDA approval of controlled
substances for use, health care providers may prescribe, and pharmacists
may dispense, these substances to patients in compliance with the CSA and
state laws and guidelines. While the FDCA and the CSA are the primary
federal laws governing the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of
controlled substances, they do not regulate the practice of medicine.
Medical, dental, nursing, and pharmacy licenses are issued at the state level
through licensure boards.37
28. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (prohibiting the
interstate commerce of adulterated drugs) (repealed by Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch.
627, 52 Stat. 1040-1059 (1938)).
29. Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (repealed 1970);
United States v. Brandenburg, 155 F.2d 110, 111 (3d Cir. 1946):
Under... the statute, it is unlawful for any person to sell, barter, or exchange or
give away certain drugs (including [morphine]), except in pursuance of a written
order on a form issued for that purpose by the Secretary of the Treasury. An
exception is made to "the dispensing or distribution of any of the drugs... to a
patient by a physician ... in the course of his professional practice only.
30. Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-230, 38 Stat. 275
(repealed 1970).
31. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
32. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (2000). See also 21
U.S.C.A. §§ 301-99 (West 2003).
33. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-60. See also 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 351-60.
34. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000). See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 355.
35. See, e.g., Laurence Hammack, OxyContin, ROANOKE TIMES, 2001, at http://
www.roanoke.com/archives (noting that the FDA approved the use of 10 mg, 20 mg, and 40
mg extended-release tablets of OxyContin).
36. 21 C.F.R. § 290.1 (2003).
37. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3310.1 (McKinney 2002) (requiring licensure
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a. Categoriesof ControlledSubstances
The CSA classifies narcotics and other controlled substances in five
categories, or schedules. The scheduling of controlled substances, overseen
by the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), FDA, and the National
Institute on Drug Abuse, is determined by several factors, including the
potential for abuse, the risk to public health, and the risk of psychological or
physiological dependence.38
Schedule I substances have a high potential for abuse and are not
approved for medical use.39 Schedule I substances include heroin,
marijuana, and lysergic acid.40 Neither retail pharmacies nor providers are
authorized to dispense Schedule I substances. These substances are
available to health care providers solely for investigational research, and a
research protocol must be approved by the FDA prior to registration with
the DEA for handling Schedule I substances.41
A drug is included in Schedule II if it meets three requirements: (1) a
high potential for abuse; (2) a currently accepted medical use in treatment in
the United States; and (3) the abuse of the drug may lead to severe
psychological or physical dependence.42 Among Schedule II substances are
fentanyl, morphine, hydromorphone, oxycodone, and amphetamines.43 In
contrast to Schedule I substances, health care providers are authorized to
prescribe Schedule II substances with certain limitations.44 For example,
unlike other prescription drugs, which a pharmacist may dispense upon
receiving a telephone or fax prescription, a pharmacist generally may not
dispense a Schedule II drug before having received and reviewed an
original, signed prescription. 45 Also unlike other prescription drugs, a
prescription for a Schedule II drug may not include an authorization for
46
refills.
prior to dispensing controlled substances).
38.

21 U.S.C. § 811 (c) (2000) (directing the Attorney General to consider: (1) the drug's

actual or relative potential for abuse; (2) scientific evidence of its pharmacologic effect; (3)
the state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug; (4) the drug's history and

current pattern of abuse; (5) the scope, duration, and significance of abuse; (6) any risk to the
public health; (7) the psychic or physiological dependence liability; and (8) whether the
substance is an immediate precursor of a substance that is already controlled).
39. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2000). See generally 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(l)-(6), (c).
40. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (c)(1 1), (d)(18)-(19) (2003).
41. See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.18(a) (2003).
42. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2).
43. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) Schedule II (b)(6); 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(1)(12), (14)-(15),
(d)(1) (2003).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 829(a) (2000). See generally 21 U.S.C. § 829(a)-(b).
45. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.11(a) (2003).
46. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.12 (2003) (forbidding refills on Schedule II drugs), 21 C.F.R. §
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Schedule III substances have a lower potential for abuse than substances
in Schedules I and II, are accepted for medical use, and may lead to low to
moderate physical dependence or a high psychological dependence.47
Examples include secobarbital, pentobarbital, and anabolic steroids.48
Schedule IV drugs have a low potential for abuse in comparison to
Schedule III drugs, are currently accepted medical for medical use, and may
lead to limited physical or psychological dependence in comparison to
Schedule III substances. 49 Among Schedule V drugs are alprazolam,
phenobarbital, triazolam, and fenfuramine.5 ° Schedule V substances have a
low potential for abuse relative to Schedule IV substances, are currently
accepted for medical use, and may lead to limited physical and
psychological dependence relative to the drugs in Schedule IV. 51 Examples
include low doses of codeine and opium.52
The CSA authorizes pharmacists to dispense Schedule III, IV, and V
substances pursuant to a written, fax, or telephone prescription from a
health care provider.5 3 Schedule III and IV drugs are limited to five refills;
there is no refill limit for Schedule V drugs.54
b. PrescriptionRequirements
The CSA and its implementing regulations establish mandatory
prescription requirements with which health care providers who intend to
distribute or dispense narcotics must comply. 55 The CSA imposes a general
prohibition on the distribution and dispensing of controlled substances in
the United States, with a few well-delineated exceptions. 56 Among the
exceptions is a provision that authorizes dispensing controlled substances
pursuant to registration with the Attorney General ("DEA registration").57

1306.22(a) (2003) (permitting up to five refills on Schedule III and IV drugs).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(3).
48. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.13(c)(1)(ii)-(iii), (f)(1) (2003).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(4).
50. 21 C.F.R. §1308.14(c)(1), (42), (48), (d)(1) (2003).
51. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(5).
52.

21 C.F.R. § 1308.15(c)(1), (5) (2003).

53. 21 U.S.C. § 829(b); 21 C.F.R. § 1306.2 1(a) (2003).
54. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.22(a)(1) (2003).
55. 21 U.S.C. § 842(a)(1) (2000). See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 842(a)(1) (West 2003). See
generally 21 U.S.C. § 842(a)-(c).
56. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000) (prohibiting any person from knowingly or
intentionally creating, distributing, or dispensing, or possessing with the intent to distribute
or dispense, a controlled substance).
57. 21 U.S.C. § 822(b). See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West 2003). See generally
21 U.S.C. § 822(a)-(d).
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Under this exception, in order to dispense" a controlled substance, a
medical practitioner or pharmacist must first be state-licensed, both to
practice and to prescribe controlled substances, and then must also
successfully complete DEA registration.5 9 Health care providers need a
DEA registration in order to prescribe controlled substances, even if their
state licenses allow them to prescribe other prescription medication. A
practitioner will generally be approved for registration, unless the DEA
determines that the issuance of the registration is inconsistent with the
public interest. 60 The DEA considers five factors to determine whether
registration is consistent with the public interest:
(1) the recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board or
professional disciplinary authority;
(2) the applicant's experience in dispensing, or conducting research with
respect to controlled substances;
(3) the applicant's conviction record under Federal or State laws relating
to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled
substances;
(4) compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws relating to
controlled substances; and
(5) such other conduct which may threaten the public health and
safety.61
If these five factors are satisfied, the DEA will grant registration and the
licensed health care provider will be authorized to prescribe or dispense
narcotics so long as it is for a legitimate medical purpose in the course of
professional practice. While the phrase "legitimate medical purpose" is not
defined under the CSA, the DEA may assess whether a controlled substance
provides a therapeutic benefit to the medical condition of the patient (i.e.,
the substances improve pain relief).62 A prescription for a controlled
substance that is not intended to treat a medical condition (as when diverted
to street or recreational use) will be determined to have no legitimate
medical purpose.63
58. The term "dispense" means "to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or
research subject by, or pursuant to the lawful order of, a practitioner, including the
prescribing and administering of a controlled substance." 21 USC § 802 (2000).
59. 21 U.S.C. § 822(a)(2); 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.11, .13 (2003). See also 21 U.S.C. §
822(d), 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.22-.24 (2003) (permitting and specifying conditions for a waiver
of registration).
60. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2000). See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 823(f) (West 2003).
61. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f).
62. See, e.g., Murray J. Walker, Jr., M.D., 55 Fed. Reg. 5306 (Dep't Justice, Feb. 14,
1990) (hearing on registration revocation) (finding physician prescribed opioids to patients
and undercover DEA agents for "no legitimate medical purpose").
63. Id. An important ongoing debate is whether the use of controlled substances for
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c. Penalties Under the CSA
In addition to registration requirements, the CSA establishes a range of
administrative, civil, and criminal penalties. The Attorney General, through
the DEA, is charged with implementing and enforcing the CSA. 4 The
Attorney General may suspend or revoke a provider's registration to
distribute or dispense a controlled substance65 if the provider has acted in a
manner inconsistent with the public interest.
In determining whether revocation or suspension of a registration is in
the public interest, the DEA may assess whether registrants' practices
threaten the "public health and safety" independently of whether the State
suspended or revoked their licenses to practice the healing arts or prescribe
controlled substances.6 6 Thus, while the DEA must ensure that practitioners
are in good standing as state licensees before registering them, 67 it is not
physician-assisted suicide ("PAS") is a legitimate medical purpose under the CSA. In 2001,
the U.S. Attorney General issued an interpretive rule that prohibited the prescribing,
administering, or dispensing controlled substances for the purposes of assisting suicide. See
Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
The rule was aimed at overruling Oregon's PAS law and specifically allowed for the
revocation of DEA registration of any health care provider who participated in assisted
suicide using controlled substances. Id.In response, the State of Oregon filed suit in federal
court seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the federal government from invalidating
the state's PAS law. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1079 (D. Or. 2001).
The court granted Oregon's motion for summary judgment and issued a permanent
injunction preventing enforcement of the rule. Id. at 1093. The Department of Justice
appealed, and the case is presently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See
Compassion News: Ashcroft v. Oregon Archive, at http://www.compassionindying.org/
ashcroftarchive.php. An affirmance of the injunction would insure that states retain their
traditional authority to define what constitutes a legitimate medical purpose of controlled
substances, see U.S. v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1981), and would insulate
Oregon health care providers from the onerous fear of federal prosecution for prescribing
controlled substances for assisted suicides.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 871(b) (2000).
65. 21 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2000). See also § 824(c) (requiring an order to show cause and
a hearing before the Attorney General before a registration may be denied, revoked or
suspended); 21 U.S.C.A. § 824 (West 2003).
66. H.R. REP. No. 106-378, at 4 (1999), available at 1999 WL 816955. See, e.g., Hugh
I. Schade, M.D., 60 Fed. Reg. 56,354 (denial of application) (Dep't Justice Nov. 8, 1995)
(denying registration to a physician whose conduct objectively threatened "public health and
safety" when he prescribed potentially lethal amounts of Darvocet to a depressed patient
who used them to commit suicide); Samuel Fertig, M.D., 49 Fed. Reg. 6577 (denial of
application) (Dep't Justice Feb. 22, 1984) (denying registration to a physician who
prescribed massive quantities of controlled substances to several young individuals who used
them in lethal overdoses, ruling that the physician "was responsible, directly or indirectly,
for the deaths of several young people" and that the application must be denied to protect
"public health and safety").
67. Jose R. Castro, M.D, 62 Fed. Reg. 16,189 (denial of application) (Dep't Justice Apr.
4, 1997) ("The DEA does not have statutory authority under the Controlled Substances Act
to issue or maintain a registration if the applicant or registrant is without state authority to
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required to wait until the practitioners' state licenses have been suspended
or revoked before withdrawing their DEA registrations. The DEA will,
however, consider practitioners' state licensing status as a factor in
determining whether to suspend or revoke registration.68 The suspension or
revocation of DEA registration is a formidable penalty, first because it
likely disrupts providers' practices by precluding them in some cases from
prescribing medically-appropriate medication, and perhaps more onerously,
because it may constitute grounds for state disciplinary action.
Failure to comply with the CSA also subjects providers to potentially
severe civil and criminal penalties, including a civil fine of up to $25,00069
and, for willful violators, up to one year in prison and a fine of up to
$25,000.70 However, while the substantial penalties provided for by the
CSA do serve as a reminder that the federal government views DEA
registration as a grave responsibility, actual prosecution for abusive
71
prescription of controlled substances is often left to the states.
2. DEA Policies and Position Statements
Federal policy on the medical use of controlled substances is embodied
not only in the CSA and associated regulations, but also in DEA manuals
and statements. For example, the DEA recognized in its 1990 Physician's
Manual that the use of controlled substances to manage pain is a legitimate
medical use and encouraged physicians to prescribe, dispense or administer
narcotics when used for a legitimate medical purpose.7 2
More recently, in 2001, the DEA joined with twenty-one pain and health
organizations to issue a joint statement on the use and abuse of pain
medication and physician reluctance to manage pain with controlled
handle controlled substances in the state in which he conducts business.").
68. 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(3). The CSA was enacted to establish a uniform national
standard for the control and availability of narcotics, and a system of enforcement and
penalties that is independent of State law. H.R. REP. No. 106-378, pt. 1, at 2 (1999) (House
Comm. on the Judiciary, considering the Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, HR 2260
(1999)). See also Hugh I. Schade, M.D., 60 Fed. Reg. at 56,356 (denying application for
registration even though the physician had a valid license to practice medicine in the state of
California).
69. 21 U.S.C. § 842(c)(1)(A) (2000). See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 842(c)(1)(A) (West 2003).
70. 21 U.S.C. § 842(c)(2)(A). Penalties are even more severe for practitioners found to
have abused their prescribing authority. Illicit distribution, use of a false registration
number, and falsifying DEA registration records are each punishable by imprisonment of up
to four years and fines of up to $30,000. 21 U.S.C.A. § 843(d)(1).
71. See, e.g., Anne Alpers, Criminal Act or Palliative Care? Prosecutions Involving
Care of the Dying, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 308, 312-15 (1998) (cataloging state medical
board disciplinary actions taken against physicians in assisted dying cases).
72. DEA, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (DOJ), PHYSICIAN'S MANUAL: AN INFORMATIONAL
OUTLINE OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT OF 1970 (1990).
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substances.7 3 The statement was noteworthy, not only because it affirmed
government support for the legitimate use of prescription drugs for patients
in pain, but also because it was the first ever public collaboration between
the DEA and organizations supporting pain management.74
Importantly, the statement recognized that the undertreatment of pain is a
serious problem in the United States that affects both chronic pain sufferers
and the terminally ill. The statement also recognized that there exists
shared responsibility between health care professionals, law enforcement,
and regulatory personnel, both for ensuring that controlled substances are
available to chronic and terminal patients and for assuring that pain control
drugs are not abused. Finally, the statement emphasized that while the
prevention of drug abuse is an important societal goal, it should not thwart
pain management efforts. 75 However, while the joint statement voices
support for the use of narcotics to manage pain, it fails to adequately
address the reluctance of health care providers to prescribe controlled
substances for fear of federal investigations and enforcement actions.
3. Enforcement
As noted above, the federal government takes seriously the mandate of
the CSA and has the authority to pursue significant penalties for its
violation; however, for all of the regulatory and prosecutorial power
afforded by the CSA, it is rare for the DEA to actually revoke a registration
or pursue criminal prosecution under the Act. While there are more than
950,000 practitioners registered with the DEA to prescribe controlled
substances, 76 the DEA revoked only thirty practitioner registrations in
2002. 77 Nevertheless, the number of DEA actions against health care
providers is increasing.
The thirty practitioner revocations in 2002
represent a significant increase from the ten revocations in 2000 and the
thirteen revocations in 2001.78
73.
74.
75.

DEA Press Release, supra note 2.
Id.
Id. In fact, DEA Administrator Asa Hutchinson urged a policy that:
[P]rotects the appropriate use of opioid pain relievers for patients who need them
while also preventing abuse and diversion of drugs .... We don't want to cause
patients who have legitimate needs for these medications, to be discouraged or
afraid to use them. And we don't want to restrict doctors and pharmacists from
providing these medications when appropriate ....

Id.
76.

DEA,

DOJ,

REGISTRANT

POPULATION:

SUMMARY,

at

http://

www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugreg/pop/summary.htm.
77.

DEA, DOJ, REGISTRANT ACTIONS: 2002, at http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/

fed regs/actions/2002/index.html.
78.

DEA, DOJ, REGISTRANT ACTIONS: 2000, at http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/
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When the DEA investigates a health care provider for violations of the
CSA it begins by investigating the provider's prescribing practices. The
DEA may initiate an investigation if it finds that a practitioner is
it
prescribing controlled substances in aberrantly high quantities, or if 79
provider.
care
health
or
pharmacist,
patient,
a
from
receives a complaint
Under the CSA and implementing regulations, the DEA has the power to
conduct administrative inspections for the purpose of completing a physical
inventory of the controlled substances on the premises and reviewing
records and information concerning the distribution of controlled
substances by a health care provider. The DEA may also inquire into any
8° As part
significant increases in the prescribing of controlled substances.
of its investigation, the DEA may send undercover agents to a provider's
8
office to attempt to obtain prescriptions for controlled substances. '
DEA investigations can last several months, after which the DEA may
take formal action to suspend or revoke a health care provider's DEA
registration or may pursue criminal prosecution under the CSA. The
DEA's investigatory and prosecutorial powers are broad, far-reaching, and
fearsome; the mere fact of being investigated by the DEA, even without a
subsequent finding of culpability, can taint a practitioner's reputation and
affect his practice. For example, in 1987 the DEA investigated Dr. Albert
Brady, an oncologist from Portland, Oregon, for prescribing high doses of
82
the painkiller Dilaudid to a cancer patient in a nursing home. The DEA
suspected that Dr. Brady was supplying Dilaudid to the black market rather
than to his patient.8 3 Although the DEA ultimately concluded that Dr.
Brady was not illicitly prescribing Dilaudid, it nevertheless notified the
State Board of Medical Examiners, which fined Dr. Brady $5000 and
suspended his license for a month for overprescribing controlled
substances. 8" Dr. Brady told the Journal of NIH Research that, as a result
of this experience, his two partners "changed their practice overnight and
85
became reluctant to prescribe sufficient doses of painkillers.
fed regs/actions/2000/index.html; DEA, DOJ, REGISTRANT ACTIONS: 2001, at http://
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/fedregs/actions/2001/index.html.
79. See, e.g., Hugh I. Schade, M.D., 60 Fed. Reg. at 56,355 (reporting that the DEA
began an investigation of Dr. Schade after receiving information that Dr. Schade had
purchased quantities of controlled substances in "in excess of average U.S. and California
practitioners").
80. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.03(c), (e) (2003).
81. U.S. v. Rosen, 582 F.2d 1032, 1032 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978).
82. Jacob Sullum, No Relief in Sight, REASON, Jan. 1998, at http://www.reason.com/
9701/fe.jacob.html.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. See also Hugh McIntosh, 83 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1282, 1283 (1991)
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While Dr. Brady's case may not be typical, it illustrates the impact that
the DEA can have when it takes action, and the potentially chilling effect a
mere investigation can have, not only on a practitioner's future conduct, but
on the conduct of the entire medical profession. Indeed, recent federal
investigations targeting the abusive distribution and use of the painkiller
OxyContin have created a climate of fear surrounding the legitimate use of
the drug, and perhaps other controlled substances, for pain management.
OxyContin, a highly effective time-release pain medication, was introduced
in 1995 and quickly acquired a reputation as a miracle drug for those with
severe and chronic pain.86 However, at the same time that OxyContin was
helping patients win the war on pain, it was being sold on the black market
and used as an illicit street drug. Consequently, over the past two years the
DEA and the FDA have closely examined the misuse and abuse of
OxyContin and scrutinized providers that prescribe the drug. Thus far, the
DEA has relegated to the states the task of prosecuting the inappropriate
prescription of OxyContin. 87 Even so, the fear of possible DEA
prosecution, state prosecution, or state de-licensing has stoked physicians'
fears about using OxyContin, even where its use would be medically
appropriate. 8
Thus, doctors seem to be taking a more conservative
approach to prescribing effective painkillers, setting back hard-won
progress in the war against pain. 89 Any policy that purports to improve pain
management must address the issue of over-regulation of effective pain
medication at the expense of patient welfare.
It should be noted, though, that while the DEA has arguably overregulated OxyContin and other painkillers, illicit and improper prescription
and use of these drugs is a genuine problem. Doctors who abuse their
authority to prescribe controlled substances are probably few in number, but
represent a legitimate target for criminal prosecution. For instance, in
United States v. Larson, a physician was convicted of distributing a
controlled substance and conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. 90
In affirming the conviction, the court rejected the physician's argument that

(describing the case of Dr. Ronald H. Blum, associate director of the Kaplan Cancer Center
at New York University, in which, after Dr. Blum endured an eighteen month investigation
and incurred $10,000 in legal fees, the DEA dismissed all charges).
86. Tanya Alberts & Damon Adams, OxyContin Crackdown Raises Physician, Patient
Concerns, AMEDNEWS.COM, June 25, 2001, at http://www.amednews.com/2001/
prl 10625.html (noting physician fears of DEA and licensure actions are growing in light of
OxyContin controversy).
87. See infra text accompanying notes 199-209.
88. Alberts & Adams, supra note 86.
89. Id.
90. United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385, 390 (9th Cir. 1974).
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the Government was required to present expert testimony to establish that
the physician did not prescribe controlled substances in the usual course of
medical practice and that he or she was acting other than for a legitimate
medical purpose. 91 The court found that the jury could make inferences
from ordinary testimonial evidence and the facts and circumstances
92
surrounding the prescriptions.
The court determined that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Dr.
Larson's conviction. First, Dr. Larson prescribed excessive quantities of
controlled substances, he camouflaged the excess by spreading the
quantities over multiple prescriptions, and he charged a fee for each
prescription.9 3 Additionally, Dr. Larson cautioned a "patient" about having
94
Lastly, Dr.
his prescription filled repeatedly at the same pharmacy.
"reds"
including
prescribed,
he
drugs
the
for
name
Larson used the street
9 5 The court found that these
(seconal) and "speed" (methamphetimine).
facts and circumstances, without more, supported the jury's determination
that Dr. Larson was not acting for a legitimate medical purpose or in the
usual course of his professional practice.
Cases like Dr. Larson's, while rare, illustrate the type of conduct that the
CSA was intended to protect against. Despite the limited number of formal
actions against physicians for over-prescribing controlled substances for
pain relief, federal enforcement actions and the resulting penalties imposed
against physicians for prescribing drugs create a barrier to the adequate
treatment of pain. Stories like Dr. Brady's have had a chilling effect on
physicians who prescribe controlled substances to manage pain. Even
though the chance of a federal investigation involving prescriptions for
controlled substances is quite low, it should come as no surprise that
physicians remain reluctant to prescribe pain medication for fear of the
potential penalties and the consequent loss of professional standing and
ability to earn a livelihood. 96 With so much at stake, providers choose to
undertreat pain instead of treating their patients as they would like to. Any
policy that is intended to improve pain management must address the fear
of regulatory scrutiny. This might include revising the guidelines for DEA
investigations and enforcement actions to include a safe harbor provision
91. Id. at 387.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 387-88.
95. Id. at 388.
96. Ann M. Martino, In Search of a New Ethic for Treating Patients with Chronic Pain:
What Can Medical Boards Do?, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 332, 337 (1998) (arguing that
physicians have perversely strong incentives to undertreat chronic pain, leading to the
syndrome of"opiophobia," the fear of prescribing narcotics).
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that would immunize health care providers who, in good faith, prescribe
controlled substances for pain.9 7
4. Federal Policies Strike a Balance Between the
Control and Availability of Narcotics
Although federal enforcement actions against physicians impede pain
management, David Joranson of the Pain & Policy Studies Group of the
University of Wisconsin Comprehensive Cancer Center, has suggested that
the CSA, as a whole, represents a "balanced" approach in which the
availability of drugs to patients for pain relief is balanced with the control
of narcotics to prevent drug diversion and abuse.98 Few would challenge
the notion that a balanced approach is both desirable and necessary as a way
to address and minimize the fears of health care providers who limit
prescriptions of opioids out of fear of regulatory scrutiny.
a. Aspects of FederalPolicy That Enhance Pain Management
While the CSA penalizes those providers who abuse their authority to
prescribe, the CSA contains provisions which it can be implied that the use
of narcotics is promoted in order to better manage pain. For example,
federal policy specifically reflects the appropriateness of using narcotics to
treat pain.
This should be viewed by health care providers as
encouragement to prescribe pain medication without fear of undue reprisals.
It is also clear from the plain language of the statute that Congress intended
that the CSA not unduly restrict practitioners from prescribing narcotics. 99
Section 801 of the CSA recognizes that controlled substances "have a
useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to maintain the
health and general welfare of the American people."100
The CSA further provides that psychotropic substances' 1 should be
controlled in accordance with the drug schedules established under the CSA
to ensure that these substances are available for legitimate medical and
scientific purposes. 10 2 This is significant because psychotropic drugs,
which are powerful mind- and mood-altering substances, are frequently

97.

See infra Part VA.

98.

JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 3.

99. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000). See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 801 (West 2003).
100. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (listing Congress' findings and declarations).
101. Psychotropics are "[d]rugs that affect psychic function, behavior, or experience."
TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1632 (Clayton L. Thomas ed., 1993).
Psychotropics include antidepressants,
antipsychotics, lithium, and sleeping pills.
102. 21 U.S.C. § 801(1).
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used in combination with opioids to treat pain caused by nervous system
Congressional support for legitimate medical use of
damage. 10 3
psychotropics, including for medical pain management, suggests
concomitant support for the legitimate medical use of opioids to treat pain.
Thus, Joranson's view that the CSA effectively balances the need for
effective pain treatment with the need to prevent drug abuse finds
unambiguous support in both the text and tenor of the statute; simply put,
the law is not intended to diminish the medical usefulness of opioids. It is
in this context that it becomes more important for federal regulators to be
aware that pain management is a fundamental part of medical practice.
There are other aspects of the CSA that are noteworthy because they
support a policy of effective pain management by allowing patients to have
access to drugs without overburdening the provider with administrative
requirements:
* The CSA does not limit the quantity of drug prescribed or
dispensed and avoids using quantity or duration to determine the
legitimacy of the physician's treatment of the patient.
* There are no maximum doses identified under the CSA for
controlled substances.
* The CSA does not limit the period of validity for a controlled
substances prescription.'0 4
* The CSA does not limit the number of refills of a controlled
substance prescription for Schedules III, IV and V.
* The CSA permits pharmacists to dispense a controlled substance
upon receiving oral authorization of a prescribing health care
provider in emergency situations.
* Prescriptions for a Schedule II controlled substance may be
transmitted via facsimile provided that the original prescription
is presented to the pharmacist for review prior to dispensing the
controlled substance. 0 5
These provisions promote the availability of controlled substances to
patients and thus enhance pain management.
b. Aspects ofFederalRegulation That Impede Pain Management
While the CSA, taken as a whole, strikes a balance between preventing
the diversion of narcotics and making narcotics available to patients, there

103. Joyce M. Black & Esther Matasarran-Jacobs, LUCKMANN AND SORENSEN'S
MEDICAL-SURGICAL NURSING: A PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGIC APPROACH 321 (1993).
104. JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 29.
105. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.11(a) (2003).
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are some provisions in federal policy that may impede pain management. 106
For example, section 1306.7 of the regulations implementing the CSA
provides:
This section is not intended to impose any limitations on a physician or
authorized hospital staff to administer or dispense narcotic drugs in a
hospital to maintain or detoxify a person as an incidental adjunct to
medical or surgical treatment of conditions other than addiction, or to
administer or dispense narcotic drugs to persons with intractable pain in
which no relief or cure ... has been found after reasonable efforts. 107
While the purpose of this section appears to have been to encourage pain
management by addressing provider concerns about regulatory scrutiny, the
regulation implies that opioids should be used only in narrowly defined
circumstances and only where other treatments have failed. 108 While there
is little debate that both non-pharmacologic alternatives and non-opioid
medications are valuable, the decision to use a particular treatment for pain
should be based on medical judgment, not governmental scrutiny. 10 9 The
regulation fails to reflect that the use of opioid analgesics is an important
part of medical practice and that opioids may be used effectively and safely
to relieve pain. Thus, the regulation impedes pain management." 0
Consider 42 U.S.C. § 14,402 which provides that no provision of the Act
should be construed to discourage the use of drugs to alleviate pain, even if
such use may increase the risk of death, so long as the purpose in using the
drugs is not to cause death or to assist in the causing of death."' This
section, with its prohibitory reference to physician-assisted suicide, impedes
the management of pain with controlled substances because it perpetuates
the erroneous belief that opioids hasten death, even when used simply for
pain management. The concern reflected in this provision is that use of the
medication will sedate the patient into unconsciousness. While depressed
respirations, sedation, and confusion are potential side effects of opioid
therapy, research reflects that opioids do not hasten death when titrated
appropriately. " 2 Titration involves the gradual increase of the amount of an
opioid until a balance is reached between pain relief and the adverse side

106.
107.

21 C.F.R. § 1306.7 (2003).
21 C.F.R. § 1306.7.

108.

See JORANSON

109.

Id.

ET AL.,

supra note 2, at 26.

110.

Id.

111.

42 U.S.C. § 14402 (2000).

112.

See infra text accompanying notes 228-238. See generally Susan Anderson Fohr,

The Double Effect of Pain Medication: SeparatingMyth from Reality, 1 J. PALLIATIVE MED.
315 (1998) (discussing fear from the potential side effects of opiod therapy).
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3
effects of the medication, i.e., sedation or respiratory depression." As is
currently written, the provision creates a barrier to pain management. It
should be amended to reflect that opioids are not likely to hasten death
when titrated appropriately.

B. State Regulation of ControlledSubstances
Is a Barrierto Pain Management
In addition to the federal government, individual states regulate the
prescription, dispensing, and administration of drugs and the regulation of
the medical, pharmacy, and nursing professions. Unlike federal policy,
which is relatively balanced, state regulation of controlled substances
4
causes a number of critical problems, 1 which have "the potential to
interfere with decisions about the care of individual patients that require
5
The draconian
medical expertise rather than government dictum.""
enforcement provisions in many state regulations, coupled with a very real
fear of the litigious environment for health care providers, generally has
curtailed the ability of providers to prescribe drugs to manage pain. Indeed,
many state policies have failed to balance the control of pain medication
prescriptions with the ability of patients to obtain narcotics to control pain.
1. State Pain Policy Background
State pain policies may be prescribed not only by legislated statutes and
regulations but also through guidelines and regulations of medical,
pharmaceutical, or nursing boards. All fifty states have statutes and
regulations that govern controlled substances. Many of the states classify
controlled substances according to the schedules provided in the Federal
CSA. 1 6 Every state has adopted a form of the model Uniform Controlled
Substances Act.117 All of the state laws permit prescriptions for controlled
113. Russell K. Portenoy, Opioid Therapyfor Chronic NonmalignantPain: Clinicians'
Perspective, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 296, 298 (1996). See also Glajchen, supra note 16, at
215 (noting patients usually develop tolerance to these side effects within one week to ten
days of drug therapy); Levy, supra note 7, at 1128.
114.
115.

JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.

Id.
116. Cf MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94(c), § 2 (2001) (establishing the five controlled
substances schedules under the CSA and adding a sixth schedule for all prescription drugs
not included in the fifth schedule).
117. See UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 1994 (setting forth, in the References &
Annotations, a table of jurisdictions where either the 1970, 1990 or 1994 version of the Act
has been adopted). The original Uniform Controlled Substances Act was drafted by the
The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970.
Commissioners subsequently revised the Act in 1990 and again amended it in 1994 to reflect
See generally
research regarding the use of narcotics to manage pain.
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substances, although, unlike federal law, most do not specifically recognize
the legitimate medical use of controlled substances.' 8 Moreover, some
states restrict the physician's discretion by limiting the quantity of drug that
can be prescribed at one time,'1 9 limiting the validity of a controlled
substance prescription,' 20 and prohibiting prescriptions issued to substance
abusers or requiring that such prescriptions be reported to a state agency.' 2 '
Furthermore, several state policies contain antiquated provisions that
' 22
confuse the terms "physical dependence," "tolerance," and "addiction."'
Addiction is defined as a "psychological dependence on the use of
substances for their psychic effects and is characterized by compulsive use
despite harm." Physical dependence, on the other hand, is a "physiological
state of neuroadaptation which is characterized by the emergence of a
withdrawal syndrome if the drug is stopped or decreased abruptly or if an
antagonist is administered."'' 23 Physical dependence is a foreseeable result
of opioid use and is not, itself, synonymous with addiction. 24 Physical
tolerance is the "progressive decline of the potency of an opioid with
continued use.' 2 5 It is due to physical tolerance that patients require
increasing doses of controlled substances to achieve a consistent analgesic
effect.
The regulation of professional practice in medicine, nursing, and
pharmacy occurs at the state level, 26 although federal agencies substantially
affect professional practices by denying or ending a provider's participation
in programs such as Medicare or revoking their registrations to prescribe
controlled substances. State agencies issue regulations that govern the
specific requirements for prescribing and dispensing controlled
substances. 127
In comparison to DEA regulations, state regulations
http://www.nccusl.org.
JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 490.
119. DEL. REG. § 40-700-021 (2001) (prohibiting more than 100 dosage units to be
dispensed at one time), reprintedin JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 110.
120. DEL. REG. § 40-700-021 (requiring prescriptions for Schedule II and III drugs to be
filled within seven days of the original date of the prescription).
121. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11156 (West 2001) (prohibiting prescriptions for
controlled substances to be issued to an "addict or habitual user").
122. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS art. 27, § 277 (2001) (repealed by
Acts 2002, ch. 26, § 2, eff. Oct. 1, 2002).
123. Fujimoto, supra note 2, at 545.
124. Id. (quoting FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS. OF U.S., INC., MODEL GUIDELINES FOR

118.

THE USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES OF THE TREATMENT OF PAIN (May 1998)).

125. Perron & Schonwetter, supra note 7, at 20.
126. Cf United States v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1981) (commenting that
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was not intended to regulate the practice of
medicine).
127. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-840-421 (2002) (setting forth requirements
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and dispensing of controlled substances are often
governing the prescribing
1 28
more stringent.

State laws authorize professional boards to license and discipline
members of the profession, to investigate complaints against licensees, to
conduct investigations and hold administrative proceedings, and to adopt
regulations to implement their statutory authority.129 Board investigations
of a licensee are typically initiated by a complaint or by a referral from
another agency. 3 ° Boards differ greatly as to the procedures used for
inquiry and investigation into complaints. Some professional boards are
statutorily required to investigate each complaint received; other boards
may initiate proceedings at their discretion.13 The board investigations,
often a form of administrative review, 132 may result in disciplinary actions,
which can range from a warning or reprimand to a suspension or revocation
of prescribing privileges or a revocation of the provider's license. 133 After
administrative requirements have been exhausted, the provider may appeal
the decision to the state courts. 34 The criminal provisions of state
controlled substance laws are enforced by state and35local law enforcement
and, in some instances, the state's attorney general. 1
2. State Policies Are a Barrier to Pain Management
By contrast to federal law, state policies fail to strike a balance between
curtailing drug abuse and making pain management drugs available to those
who need them. State policies impede pain management in three critical

for advanced nurse practitioners to qualify for prescriptive authority of Schedule II through
Schedule V substances); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-887-020 (2002) (providing
documentation requirements for pharmacists); WASH. ADMIN. CODE.§ 246-919-600
(dispensing requirements for physician prescriptions of controlled substances); WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 246-919-800 (setting forth guidelines for using opioids to treat pain).
128.

JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 19, 20.

129. E.g., W. VA. CODE § 30-3-7 (2002).
130. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 30-3-14 (2002) (recognizing that the medical board may
initiate disciplinary proceedings against physicians upon receipt of information from peer
review committees or complaints from citizens, physicians, or pharmacists).
131. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 30-3-14 (2002) (granting discretion to the medical board
to initiate disciplinary proceedings against physicians based on information from peer review
committees or complaints from citizens, physicians, or pharmacists).
132. See generally MED. BD. OF CA. REG. tit. 16, § 1361 (2002) (board disciplinary
actions resolved pursuant to Administrative Procedure Act).
133. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285A(6) (West 2002) (explaining that the
medical board may suspend or revoke any license or impose probation when controlled

substances are prescribed for an illegitimate medical purpose).
134. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.510 (2003); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-10706 (2002); W. VA. CODE § 30-3-14 (2002).
135. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4796 (2002).
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ways: (1) by failing to recognize the medical value and use of opioids; (2)
by using terminology that confuses physical dependence with addiction;
and (3) by restricting medical decisions.1 36 While these critical areas are
handled differently by each state, certain commonalties are shared.
a. State Policies Failto Recognize the
Medical Value and Use of Opioids
Some state policies fail to recognize the medical value of opioids by
implying that controlled substances should be used as a last resort. For
example, an Arizona Medical Board guideline provides that the patient's
symptoms must clearly support a diagnosis that requires opioid therapy and
that "all reasonable alternative therapies have been explored." 137 A patient
may be excluded from opioid therapy if he has a history of chemical
dependency, a major psychiatric disorder, or a "chaotic social situation. '
This guideline impedes pain management because it requires that opioids be
used only after other alternative therapies have been explored.
Furthermore, it implies that opioids should not be used in certain patient
populations, for example, those patients with a history of chemical
dependency or a major psychiatric disorder. 139 The guideline fails to
recognize that the use of opioid analgesics is an important part of medical
practice and that the use of controlled substances can be a safe and effective
way to manage pain for all patients. 140 Consequently, the guideline fails to
strike a balance between control and availability by placing the prevention
of drug abuse ahead of access to narcotics for pain relief, and thereby
interferes with pain management.
b. State Policies Confuse PhysicalDependence with Addiction
State policies also fail to use terminology that distinguishes physical
dependence from addiction. For example, prior to being repealed,
Maryland's Controlled Substance Act defined a drug dependent person as
one who was "in a state ofpsychic orphysical dependence, or both, arising
from administration of that controlled dangerous substance on a continuous
basis."1 41
In defining a "drug dependent person," Maryland's Act

136.

JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.

137.
31 Az. STATE BD. OF MED.
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES (revised June

EXAMINERS,

GUIDELINES

FOR

PRESCRIBING

2003), available at http://www.bomex.org/

Regulatory/policy/7_policy.asp.

138.

Id.

139.

JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 26.

140.

Id.

141.

MD. CODE ANN., CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS § 277 (2001) (repealed by Acts 2002, ch.
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addiction with physical
inappropriately
confused psychological
dependence. The World Health Organization and others have made clear
that physical dependence on opioids - the sudden cessation of opioid drug
therapy would result in withdrawal syndrome - is not "drug dependence"
craving for the drug and
but rather is "a behavioral pattern characterized by 142
an overwhelming preoccupation with obtaining it.'
Although physical dependence and tolerance occur in patients who take
opioids over a long period, studies have shown that psychological
dependence is extremely rare. 43 State pain policies should define abuserelated terms (i.e. drug dependence) so as to avoid any confusion between
psychological addiction and physical dependence or tolerance. Undue
anxiety about psychological dependence on opioids has caused health care
providers and patients to use inadequate doses of opioids to treat pain.' 44 In
this way, Maryland impedes pain management because it implies that the
prevention of drug abuse is more important than the availability of narcotics
for pain relief.
c. State PoliciesRestrict MedicalDecisions
State policies restrict medical decisions in at least three ways. First, a
number of state policies restrict providers from prescribing pain medication
based on patient characteristics such as age, diagnosis, prognosis, and a
history of drug abuse. For example, California's Controlled Substances Act
prohibits providers from prescribing or administering a controlled substance
to an "addict or habitual user.' 45 This restriction preempts a health care
provider's medical discretion to treat pain in patients who are in the
restricted category. Medical research reflects that controlled substances can
be prescribed legitimately to individuals who are psychologically addicted
to opioids, provided that controlled substances are warranted by the
individual's medical condition. 46 California's Controlled Substances Act
prohibition substitutes government judgment for medical decision-making.
As written, California's provision fails to strike a balance by which the
control of narcotics is an equivalent priority to the availability of opioids for
pain relief and is thus a barrier to pain management.
Second, some state policies mandate that providers consult with at least

26, § 2, eff. Oct. 1, 2002) (emphasis added).

142.

JORANSON ET AL.,

supra note 2, at 24.

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11156 (West 2001).
146. Yael Swica & William Breitbart, Treating Pain in Patients with AIDS and a
Historyof SubstanceAbuse, 176 W. J. MED. 33, 33-39 (2002).
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one other provider prior to issuing a prescription for the use of controlled
substance to treat intractable pain. For example, Colorado's Medical Board
Guidelines define intractable pain as "pain in which the cause cannot be
removed or otherwise treated and no relief or cure has been found after
reasonable efforts, including evaluation by one or more physicians
specializing in the treatment of the area of the body perceivedas the source
of the pain.', 147 While physician consultation is an important part of
medical practice, Colorado's mandate that one or more pain specialists
evaluate the patient appears to regulate medical decisions about pain
management. The requirement does not take into account the expertise of
the prescribing physician or the patient's needs, which could call for
immediate attention. Federal policy is appropriately silent on this issue,
leaving the decision about whether consultation is needed to the discretion
of the physician. Colorado's guideline fails to strike a balance between
control of narcotics and the availability of opioids for pain relief, and is thus
a barrier to pain management.
Third, while federal law does not limit the quantity of drugs prescribed
or dispensed and avoids identifying a specific quantity or duration that it
deems to be legitimate, some state policies limit the amount of controlled
substances that can be prescribed or dispensed at one time in an attempt to
control the availability of narcotics and to prevent patients from becoming
addicted to controlled substances. For example, Delaware's Uniform
Controlled Substance Regulation limits the validity of a prescription for a
Schedule II substance to seven days from the original date of the
prescription, except for Schedule II prescriptions for the terminally ill or
residents of long-term care facilities, which are valid for up to sixty days
from the issue date. 148 Delaware also limits the quantity prescribed to one
hundred dosage units, with an exception being made for individuals with a
medically documented terminal illness or residents of long-term care
facilities. 149
While these restrictions reflect an important goal of preventing abuse of
controlled substances, they may not be sufficient to meet the individual
needs of patients under all circumstances. State policymakers must realize
the real-life implications that a limitation on the quantity or the duration of

147.

COLO.

MED.

1D.,

POLICY

SUBSTANCES FOR INTRACTABLE PAIN

10-14, GUIDELINES FOR PRESCRIBING CONTROLLED

(1996) (emphasis added).

148. DEL. REG. § 40-700-021 (2001). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-251(b) (2003)
(explaining that Connecticut's Controlled Substances Act restricts the quantity of Schedule
11controlled substances that can be prescribed within seven-days of the order entry;
however, the seven-day period may be extended for another seven days with the prescribing
practitioner's signature).
149.

DEL. REG. § 40-700-021.
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a prescription drug may have. For instance, patients may not have access or
transportation to a pharmacy to fill a prescription for pain medication, the
availability of which may not coincide with the duration of the
prescriptions. Also, the medical condition of a patient may limit the
individual's ability to go to doctor appointments or to a pharmacy to fill
prescriptions for pain medication. Further, some patients may live in rural
areas requiring them to travel long distances to health care providers and to
pharmacies. Delaware's restrictions are barriers to the management of pain
because such policies impede the availability of controlled substances to
patients suffering in pain.
3. Recent Developments in State Pain Policy
a. IntractablePain Treatment Acts
Over the past ten years, several states have attempted to improve patient
access to pain management and address physician reluctance to prescribe
opioids for fear of disciplinary action by enacting Intractable Pain
Treatment Acts ("IPTAs"). 150 These Acts immunize physicians from
disciplinary action by state medical boards provided that the physicians
comply with certain requirements. For example, Texas's IPTA prohibits a
medical board from subjecting a physician to disciplinary actions where, in
the course of the physician's treatment of a person for intractable pain, the
physician prescribed or administered dangerous drugs or controlled
substances.' 51 The Texas IPTA defines "intractable pain" as a "pain state in
which the cause of the pain cannot be removed or otherwise treated and
which in the generally accepted course of medical practice no relief or cure
of the cause of the pain is possible or none has been found after reasonable
efforts."'5 2 While the goal of IPTAs was to address physician reluctance to
prescribe opioids for the treatment of chronic pain due concern about
regulatory scrutiny,' 15534 "physicians in many states remain reluctant to write
such prescriptions.'
150. TEX. REv.
leg., Ist C.S., ch. 5,
151. TEX. REv.
152. TEX. REv.

153.

Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495c (Vernon 2001) (adopted by Acts 1989, 71st
§ 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1989).
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495c, §§ 3, 5.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495c, § 2(3) (emphasis added).

JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 495 (asserting that the primary goal of IPTAs

was to address physician reluctance to prescribe opioids for the treatment of chronic pain by
providing immunity from discipline by state medical boards). Joranson suggests that the
IPTAs also may have alerted state regulators and law enforcement officials to the use of
opioids for intractable pain. Id.
154.

California Initiative Attempts to Reassure Physicians Who Prescribe Opioids,

ALCOHOLISM & DRUG WKLY., Feb. 15, 1999, availableat 1999 WL 9620110.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2004

25

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 13 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 5

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 13

Although IPTAs attempted to improve patient access to pain
management and mitigate physician reticence to prescribe opioids, IPTAs

impede pain management. First, the language in the IPTAs suggests that
opioids are a last resort and that the use of opioids is not considered part of
ordinary medical practice.'5 5 Second, IPTAs apply only to prescriptions of
intractable pain, not other types of pain where the source of pain is known
and for which relief can be achieved. 156 Third, the use of the term

"intractable" implies that pain that is not treatable, even though chronic pain
can be treated.1 57

Fourth, IPTAs exclude pain patients who use drugs

"nontherapeutically" (i.e., substance abusers).

58

Fifth, IPTAs often impose

additional requirements, such as consultation with another physician and
informed consent. 59 Given these issues, IPTAs are not the "most direct or
effective way to address the desirable goal of relieving physician concern
1' 60
about regulatory scrutiny."
b. State Special PrescriptionPrograms
Some states have adopted laws requiring that physicians complete
special prescription forms by using triplicate, duplicate, or single-copy
state-issued documents.' 61 For example, New York requires that all
prescriptions for Schedule II substances be prepared by the physician in
triplicate on an official form prepared and issued by New York's
Department of Health ("DPH"). 62 A completed form identifies the patient,
the prescribing physician, and details regarding the use of the controlled

155. Joranson & Gilson, supra note 23 (identifying risks of IPTAs). See, e.g., CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2241.5(b) (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-117(1.5)(b)
(2002); MINN. STAT. § 152.125 (2002) (subdivision 1); Mo. REV. STAT. § 334.105.2(2)
(2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.3-01(2) (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.052(C)
(West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.470(2) (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.4-2(B) (2002);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495(c), § 2(3); W. VA. CODE § 30-3A-1(3) (2002).
156. Joranson & Gilson, supra note 23. See also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
4495(c), § 2(3) (providing the type of pain to which Texas's IPTA applies).
157. JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 495; Joranson & Gilson, supra note 23. See,
e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495(c), § 2(3) (defining intractable pain).
158. JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 495; Joranson & Gilson, supra note 23. See,
e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2241.5(e); Mo. REV. STAT. § 334.106(3); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 19-03-3-05 (2002).
159. JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 495; Joranson & Gilson, supra note 23. See,
e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2241.5(b); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-117(1.5)(b); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.052; OR. REV. STAT. § 677.474(3) (2002).
160. JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 495; Joranson & Gilson, supra note 23.
161. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 3338(2) (Consol. 2001); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs.
tit. 10, §§ 80.67, 80.71 (2003).
162. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 3338(2); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, §§ 80.67,
80.71.
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substance. 163 One copy of the form is retained by the physician, 164 a second

copy by the pharmacist, 165 and a third copy of the prescription is filed with
DPH. 166 The DPH is required to retain its copy of the prescription for 67a
period of five years, after which the prescriptions must be destroyed.1
Public disclosure of a patient's identity, which is168listed on a prescription for
a Schedule II substance, is expressly prohibited.
In Whalen v. Roe, a group of patients who regularly received
prescriptions for Schedule II drugs, doctors who prescribed the medication,
and two associations of physicians challenged New York's prescription
requirements. 169 These groups argued that the prescription requirements
violated the right to privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
because patients who required Schedule II drugs declined treatment for fear
that information contained on the prescriptions would be misused and that
physicians were reluctant to prescribe these drugs for fear of regulatory
scrutiny. 70 While the United States Supreme Court recognized that there
was a constitutionally protected zone of privacy that included interests in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters and in making important personal
decisions, it held that the law adequately protected privacy (1) by limiting
access to the information to authorized state employees responsible for
protecting the health of the community, and (2) by providing for built-in
protections from disclosure, such as the express prohibition on disclosing
the identity of a patient for whom a prescription for a Schedule II controlled
substance is written.' 17 The Court further held that, in contrast to a total
prohibition on the use of Schedule II substances, the law did not deprive the
public of access to the drugs. 72 The Court upheld the constitutionality of
New York's prescription requirements, finding that the law was the product
of a rational legislative decision to minimize the abuse of dangerous drugs
and did not invade any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth

163. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 3332(2)(a)-(d) (Consol. 2001); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 10, § 80.71.
164. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 3331(6) (Consol. 2001).
165. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 3333(4) (Consol. 2001); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
10, § 80.73(c)(2) (2003).
166. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 3331(6); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 80.73(c)(3).
167. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 3379(3) (Consol. 2001).
168. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 3371 (Consol. 2001); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, §
80.107 (2003).
169. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 595 (1977).
170. Id. at 599.
171. Id. at 598-602.
172. Id. at 602-03 (recognizing, however, that the concern about disclosures of identity
information discouraged the use of Schedule II substances).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2004

27

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 13 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 5

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 13

73

Amendment. 1
Similar prescription requirements are often used by state health
departments, law enforcement agencies, and licensing boards, to monitor
prescriptions of Schedule II drugs for the purpose of detecting fraud and
abuse. For instance, Kentucky's prescription monitoring system assisted
law enforcement in staging "Operation Oxyfest," the state's largest drugabuse raid to date, resulting in the arrest of 252 people. 174 The extent to
which prescription information is tracked and monitored by state health
departments or law enforcement agencies varies greatly.175 As of December
21, 2001, seventeen states monitor patients
who get prescriptions and the
76
providers who prescribe the medication. 1
Research collected in the wake of Whalen v. Roe reflects that special
prescription monitoring programs continue to have a negative impact on
prescribing controlled substances for legitimate purposes. 77 In jurisdictions
with such monitoring programs, health care providers are reluctant to
prescribe pain medication because they fear that the completion of the
special state-issued forms will trigger an investigation into their prescribing
habits by the state health department or law enforcement agency. 178 Critics
who oppose prescription monitoring systems argue that they violate
patients' privacy, are costly, and harm those in need of medication by
causing doctors to prescribe fewer and less potent drugs. 179 For example,
recent media reports reflect that physicians attempt to evade electronic
monitoring systems by prescribing tranquilizers, which have greater
potential side effects than Schedule II medication and are generally not
tracked by state electronic monitoring systems. 18° Despite evidence that
physicians avoid prescribing controlled substances due to recently-enacted
state prescription monitoring programs, it is unlikely that courts will
invalidate these programs. Relying on Whalen v. Roe, courts will likely
find that the special prescription monitoring programs are a product of an
orderly and rational legislative decision to minimize the abuse of dangerous
drugs and protect the health of the community. 81 While state prescription

173. Id. at 606.
174. Melody Peterson & Barry Meier, Few States Track Prescriptionsas a Method to
Bar Overdoses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2001, availableat www.nytimes.com.
175. JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 491.
176. David Brushwood, Maximizing the Value of Electronic Monitoring Programs, 31
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 41 & n.13 (2003).
177. JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 491 (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 30.
179. Peterson & Meier, supra note 174.
180. Id.
181. Cf Brushwood, supra note 176, at 43 (noting the uncertainty of whether the
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monitoring programs provide an important societal benefit of preventing
drug diversion and drug abuse, a more balanced approach is needed to
address the accompanying reluctance of health care providers to prescribe
controlled substances to patients for legitimate medical purposes.
4. State Medical Board Actions
State medical boards negatively influence physician prescribing practices
by monitoring prescriptions and disciplining providers who, in the opinion
of state medical boards, "over-prescribe" controlled substances for pain
management. 182 The case of Dr. Katherine Hoover illustrates the extent to
which states scrutinize providers who prescribe controlled substances and
the potential penalties that may result from such scrutiny.
In March 1994, Florida's state licensing agency filed an administrative
complaint alleging that Dr. Hoover, a board-certified physician in internal
medicine, had: (1) inappropriately and excessively prescribed Schedule II
controlled substances to seven of her patients, all of whom had been treated
by Dr. Hoover for chronic pain arising from non-cancerous conditions; and
(2) provided care that fell below the level of skill and treatment, which is
recognized by a reasonably prudent physician as being acceptable under
83 Dr. Hoover requested a formal
similar conditions and circumstances.
184
allegations.
hearing to challenge the
At the hearing, two expert witnesses for the State opined that Dr.
Hoover's conduct fell below the standard of care because she prescribed
85
excessive and perhaps lethal amounts of narcotics.' The experts' opinions
were based solely on computer printouts from pharmacies where the
86
physician's patients had filled their prescriptions. 1 The printouts indicated
only the quantity of drug filled for each patient and only occasionally
187
Neither of the expert physicians
referred to the patient's diagnosis.
specialized in the treatment of chronic pain and both experts referred their

widespread dissemination of information under electronic prescription monitoring programs
privacy
would alter the Supreme Court's view of the impact of such programs on the
patients).
interests of
182. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 2 (advocating that chronic pain patients should utilize
opioid
tort law medical malpractice actions against physicians who under prescribe
medications).
Dist. Ct.
183. Hoover v. Agency for Healthcare Admin., 676 So. 2d 1380, 1381 (Fla.
App. 1996).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1382.
186. Id. at 1381.
187. Id.
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patients to pain management clinics. 188 Dr. Hoover provided detailed
testimony as to her treatment of each patient, the patients' progress under
the prescribed medication, and the appropriateness of the medication and
89
amounts prescribed. 1
The hearing officer found that the agency failed to meet its burden of
proof on all charges. 190 The agency subsequently requested that the board
of medicine review the findings of fact and conclusions of law. 191 The
board of medicine accepted all of the agency's exceptions, amended the
findings of fact in accordance with the agency's suggestions, and found Dr.
Hoover in violation of Florida law. 192 The board's penalty included a
reprimand, a $4000 fine, and two years probation, in addition to required
continuing medical education on prescribing abusable drugs.193 Dr. Hoover
appealed the decision to the District Court of Appeals of Florida. 94
The District Court reversed the medical board's decision. First, the court
found that the evidence was insufficient to support a breach of the standard
of care. 95 Second, the court determined that the hearing officer was
entitled to give greater weight to the testimony of Dr. Hoover and her
expert witnesses where the agency's physician experts did not examine the
patients or regularly engage in the treatment of chronic pain.1 96 Third, the
court concluded that the hearing officer's finding that Dr. Hoover's
prescriptions did not exceed the federal guidelines for treatment of
intractable pain in cancer patients (even though none of the patients had
cancer) was relevant and reasonable. 197
While at least one scholar has suggested that the Hoover case and others
like it support the argument that physicians who follow established medical
practices for treating pain with opioids should have nothing to fear from
state regulatory actions, 198 it is important to point out that Dr. Hoover was
not vindicated until appellate review was complete.
It is therefore
understandable that cases like Dr. Hoover's, in which the state medical
board's decision is ultimately found to be erroneous, may provide little
consolation to physicians who prescribe controlled substances for pain

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.at 1382.
Hoover, 676 So. 2d at 1382-84.
Id. at 1382.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hoover, 676 So. 2d at 1385.

196.
197.

Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1383.

198.

Reynolds, supra note 2, at 85-86.
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Health care providers who are wrongly accused of
management.
prescribing controlled substances in violation of state law will likely endure
negative publicity, loss of reputation in the medical community, revocation
of hospital privileges, and will likely lose patients, time, and wages. Stories
like Dr. Hoover's have had a chilling effect on physicians who prescribe
narcotics to manage pain.' 99 Physicians are reluctant to prescribe pain
medication for fear of investigations and disciplinary actions by the state
professional licensing boards, which are often triggered solely by the
quantity of medication that a provider prescribes. With the potential for
sanctions, many providers choose to refer their patients to other providers
or pain management clinics for the treatment of pain to avoid prosecutions
by state medical boards. 200 This situation clearly impedes the management
of pain.
5. Law Enforcement
The enforcement of controlled substance laws by state medical boards,
coupled with criminal actions against health care prbviders, exacerbate
health care providers' reluctance to prescribe narcotics for pain
While there are only a few reported cases, anecdotal
management.
evidence suggests that doctors, nurses, and other health care providers are
distressed by potential criminal prosecution for prescribing and/or
20
administering pain medications to patients with terminal illnesses. '
Criminal actions against providers for prescribing pain medication to
patients, although rare, increase the reluctance to prescribe opioids and thus
202
impede pain management.
Between 1990 and 1998, few health care providers were convicted of
criminal charges associated with the management of pain. For example,
Ann Alpers identified six physicians who had been formally charged or
indicted for homicide between 1990 and 1998.203 Of these, two physicians
were acquitted, one pled guilty and received community service, one was
convicted of involuntary manslaughter, a "lesser offense" in relation to
homicide, one physician was convicted of attempted first-degree murder,
and one physician was convicted of second-degree murder. Both murder
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 86.
Hoover, 676 So. 2d at 1382.
Marilyn Frank-Stromborg & Anjeanette Christensen, A Serious Look at the

Undertreatment of Pain: Part 1, 5 CLINICAL J. OF ONCOLOGY NURSING No. 5, 235, 235

(2001).
202. Alpers, supra note 71, at 311.
203. Id. (estimating that at least thirteen physicians have been investigated by law
enforcement for their management of pain in patients with end-stage disease, none of whom
were formally indicted or prosecuted).
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convictions, however, were reversed on appeal. 20 4 With respect to nurses,
Alpers identified four nurses who underwent criminal investigation for the
management of pain, two of whom were indicted.20 5
Since Alpers' article, the abuse of OxyContin and media attention
regarding this issue have escalated. Law enforcement officers in several
states have brought criminal actions against providers for over prescribing
OxyContin to patients who subsequently died. In February 2002, in the
first case of its kind, a jury found Dr. James F. Graves guilty of four counts
of manslaughter, five counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance,
and one count of racketeering for prescribing OxyContin to patients.20 6
Prosecutors argued that Dr. Graves recklessly wrote prescriptions to anyone
willing to pay for an office visit without asking the proper pre-prescribing
questions, which they argued, led to several patient deaths.20 7 Dr. Graves
argued that he followed medical protocols and legitimately prescribed
OxyContin and other pain medication to patients he saw in his office,
further asserting that patients would not have died had they taken the
medication properly.20 8 While Dr. Graves plans to appeal the verdict, he
faces up to thirty years in prison.20 9 In another case, state prosecutors in
Florida charged Dr. Denis Deonarine with first-degree murder, a more
serious crime than manslaughter, after his patient died from an OxyContin
overdose. 10
Because of increased focus on OxyContin, the reluctance of providers to
prescribe OxyContin and other pain medications will continue, if not
intensify. The reluctance of providers to prescribe narcotics for fear of
criminal sanctions fails to achieve a balance in state pain policy. Instead,
the prevention of abuse through enforcement actions overshadows efforts to
improve the availability of controlled substances to patients in pain.
Commentators have argued that the collective impact is to dissuade doctors

204. Id. Cf Frank-Stromborg & Christensen, supra note 201, at 235 (stating that
hospital administrators are alarmed by the possibility that physicians may be criminally
prosecuted for administering pain medications to dying patients).
205. Alpers, supranote 71, at 311.
206. Tanya Albert, Florida Physician Guilty of Manslaughter in OxyContin Case, AM.
MED. NEWS, Mar. 11, 2002, available at http://www.ama-assn/org/sci-pubs/amnews/
pick_02/prl203 11.html. The fact that a physician was convicted on a criminal charge of
manslaughter is likely to have an effect on how physicians treat patients with chronic pain.
Id. According to B. Eliot Cole, M.D., Continuing Medical Education Director at the
American Academy of Pain Management, "[e]very one of these headlines probably makes
10,000 doctors wish they had gone to law school." Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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211
These arguments are plausible
from aggressively treating pain.
notwithstanding the dearth of decisional law on this issue, principally
because of the increased media focus on criminal investigations for
OxyContin abuse coupled with the specter of criminal investigations.
Because these enforcement efforts have the potential to impact provider
livelihood and liberty, it should come as no surprise that providers would
choose to undertreat pain.

C. AttitudinalBarriers to Pain Management
The undertreatment of pain in the medical setting has sources that run far

[of health care providers] to provide adequate pain
deeper than 2reluctance
12
medication.

Although the reluctance of health care providers to prescribe narcotics
for fear of criminal sanctions has exacerbated the problem of
undertreatment of pain,21 3 underprescribing narcotics for pain is caused by a
multitude of factors. The attitudes of health care providers, patients and
their families, and the public at large, are among the factors that both create
and perpetuate barriers to pain management. For example, two major
misconceptions about narcotics and pain present barriers to the management
of pain: (1) a fear that opioids cause addiction, and (2) that the use of
opioids can lead to terminal sedation. These misconceptions perpetuate the
underprescribing of narcotics to treat pain and create barriers to proper and
adequate treatment of pain.2 14
1. Opiophobia
Torture, despair, agony, and death are the symptoms of "opiophobia," a
well-documented medical syndrome fed by fear, superstition, and the war
Patients suffer the
Doctors suffer the syndrome.
on drugs.

211. E.g., Alpers, supra note 71, at 324-25.
212. Martino, supra note 96, at 334 (citing David B. Morris, Pain'sDominion: What We
Make of Pain, WILSON Q., Sept. 22, 1994, at 3).
213. Id. at 332.
214. Patricia M. Clark, PharmacologicPainManagement in the Elderly CancerPatient,
Nursing Society,
Medscape Conference Coverage of the 26th Congress of the Oncology
4
May 17-20, 2001, available at www.medscape.com/viewarticle/ 18569 (noting patient
&
beliefs about pain can be barriers to the management of pain). See also David E. Joranson
Pain
Opioids:
Toward
Attitudes
and
of
Knowledge
Aaron M. Gilson, Pharmacists'
Medication in Relation to Federal and State Policies, 41 J. AM. PHARMACEUTICAL Assoc.
213, 217 (2001). In a 2001 survey of pharmacists, Joranson and Gilson concluded that the
incorrect knowledge and inappropriate attitudes of some pharmacists could contribute to a
failure to dispense valid prescriptions for opioid analgesics to patients in pain. Id.
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consequences.21 5
Both health care providers and patients alike have been affected by what
is described as "opiophobia. ''2 16 Opiophobia is the fear that the use of
narcotics causes drug addiction and drug abuse, and consequently is a factor
that creates a barrier to pain management. 217 The fear of addition to
narcotics appears to be based on the widespread misperception that physical
dependence is equivalent to addiction. Recent studies confirm that health
care providers are reluctant to prescribe, dispense, or administer opioids
because they fear causing addiction or contributing to the drug abuse
problem. 218 For example, in a survey of 386 physicians in Texas, 25% of
the respondents believed that any patient who is given opioids for pain
relief is at significant risk for addiction.21 9 More than 90% of physicians
"believed that they must exercise caution when prescribing potentially
0
addictive medications to patients with chronic pain.,' 22
Fear of drug addiction and drug abuse is far greater for patients in
chronic pain in comparison to terminally ill individuals. 22' For example, in
a survey of 161 primary care physicians, 35% of the respondents were
never willing to prescribe Schedule II opioids on a twenty-four hour basis
for patients with chronic non-malignant pain, even after exhaustive
evaluation and attempts at treatment.22 2 Two percent of the physicians were
never willing to prescribe Schedule III opioids (e.g., Tylenol with codeine)

215.

Sullum, supra note 82.

216. John P. Morgan, American Opiophobia: Customary Underutilization of Opioid
Analgesics, 5 ADVANCES IN ALCOHOL & SUBSTANCE ABUSE 163, 163-73 (1986).

217. See Sullum, supra note 82. Sullum states that opiophobia is a result of deeply
routed prejudices and that Americans have always had mixed feelings about drugs. Id. To
deal with our ambivalence, we tend to divide drugs into neat categories: good and bad, legal
and illegal, therapeutic and recreational. We are not comfortable with drugs that straddle
categories, as the opioids do. The discomfort is strengthened by historical experience,
ranging from Civil War veterans hooked on morphine to middle-class housewives hooked on
over-the-counter remedies in the years before the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914. Id.

218. David E. Joranson et al., Trends in Medical Use and Abuse of Opioid Analgesics,
283 JAMA 1710, 1710 (2000).

219.

Sharon M. Weinstein et al., Physicians' Attitudes Toward Pain and the Use of

OpioidAnalgesics: Results of a Survey from the Texas CancerPain Initiative, 93 S. MED. J.

479, 482 (2000).
220. Id.
221.
See generally Jamie H. Von Roenn et al., Physician Attitudes and Practice in
Cancer Pain Management: A Survey from the Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group, 119
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 121 (1993) (surveying health care practitioners to determine the

amount of knowledge about cancer pain and to determine the methods of pain control being
used by physicians), available at http://www.annals.org/cgi/content/full/1 19/2/121.

222. Michael Potter et al., Opioids for Chronic Nonmalignant Pain: Attitudes and
Practices of Primary Care Physicians in the UCSF/Stanford Collaborative Research
Network, 50 J. FAvl. PRAC. 145, 147-48 (2001).
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223

as needed for patients with chronic and persistent non-malignant pain.
The surveyors concluded that the reluctance of primary care physicians to
prescribe opioids for chronic non-malignant pain is connected to concerns
about dependence, tolerance, and addiction, and that primary care
physicians were generally more concerned about physical dependence,
tolerance, and addiction than they were about diversion for illegal use,
regulatory scrutiny, or side effects.224
Health care providers often confuse the terms physical dependence,
tolerance, and psychological dependence and "mistakenly interpret a
225 Despite provider fears,
satisfactory analgesic drug effect as euphoria.,
there is evidence that patients treated with narcotics rarely become
6 For example, in 1980,
psychologically addicted to pain medication.22
researchers at Boston University Medical Center reported that they had
reviewed records of 11,882 hospital patients treated with narcotics and
found "only four cases of reasonably well documented addiction in patients
who had no history of addiction. 2 27 Similarly, a 1982 study of 10,000 burn
victims who had received narcotic injections, most of them for weeks or
months, found no cases of drug abuse that could be attributed to pain
treatment.2 28 These studies demonstrate that the legitimate use of controlled
substances is unlikely to cause psychological addiction to narcotics.
Scientific literature also supports the notion that the use of controlled
substances does not contribute to an increase in opioid abuse. In a recent
evaluation, researchers found that the medical use of opioids had increased
between 1990 and 1996, but there was no evidence of a corresponding
increase in abuse. 229 Misconceptions about opioids cause reluctance on the
part of health care providers to prescribe, dispense, or administer narcotics
for pain relief, particularly in chronic pain patients and are thus a barrier to
the adequate management of pain with controlled substances.

Id. at 147.
224. Id. (assessing pharmacists' attitudes toward the legality of prescribing opioids and
223.

finding that only seventy-five percent of pharmacists considered prolonged prescribing for
cancer pain to be lawful and acceptable medical practice).
225. Weinstein et al., supra note 219, at 479.
226. Fujimoto, supra note 2, at 545-46 (citing Samuel Perry & George Heidrich,
Management of Pain DuringDebridement: A Survey of US Burn Units, 13 PAIN 267 (1982)).
227. Sullum, supra note 82 (citing Jane Porter & Herschel Jick, Addiction Rare in
Patients Treated with Narcotics, 302 NEw ENG. J. MED. 123 (1980)).
228. Sullum, supra note 82.
229. Joranson et al., supra note 218, at 1712 (noting that the the incidence of drug
addiction for patients taking opioids is less than one percent). See also Tanabe &
Buschmann, supra note 17, at 299.
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2. Fear That High Doses of Pain Medications Will Lead to Death
In contrast to chronic pain, the public at large and health care providers
generally support the use of controlled substances to comfort terminally ill
patients suffering in pain. 23 0 However, both health care providers and
patients have concerns that opioids may result in terminal sedation. As
physical tolerance develops, there is fear that higher doses of narcotics will
slow the patient's breathing to a point that the breathing ceases and the
patient dies. While this misconception is prevalent,23 ' there is little
empirical evidence that a faster death ensues when opioids are used to
manage severe pain in dying patients.232 In fact, when properly titrated,
opioids are entirely safe. Nevertheless, some providers are reluctant to
prescribe opioids to terminally ill patients for fear of terminal sedation.
Although appropriate titration generally does not result in terminal
sedation, it is difficult to determine the correct amount of drugs to
administer. Clinicians suggest that there is no maximal or optimal quantity
of an opioid analgesic drug for either chronic or cancer pain.233 The
appropriate dose is one that relieves the patient's pain without causing
adverse side effects. 234 In some instances, patients with severe cancer pain
may require 1200 to 1800 milligrams of oral morphine per day, while other
cancer patients may require a greater dosage of intravenous morphine at
1000 to 4500 milligrams per hour.235 Clinicians such as Dr. Michael Levy
recommend that the "initial dose of a drug should be based on the patient's

230. Von Roenn et al., supra note 219.
231. JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 27. Courts, likely relying on the opinions of
health care providers, have reinforced the erroneous belief that opioids cause respiratory
depression and hasten death. For example, in Vacco v. Quill, the United States Supreme
Court held that New York's ban on assisted suicide did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 521 U.S. 793, 796 (1997). See also concurring
op. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In a
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, stated that
the provision of pain-relieving medications to a patient that hastened death would not violate
the state laws prohibiting assisted suicide. Id.at 737. Justice O'Connor wrote that "a patient
who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is experiencing great pain has no legal
barriers to obtaining medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even
to the point of causing unconsciousness, and hastening death." Id. at 736-37. She further
stated, "[t]here is no dispute that dying patients ... can obtain palliative care, even when
doing so would hasten their deaths." Id. at 737-38. While these statements support the use
of opioids for pain management, they do not reflect the empirical evidence on this subject,
which demonstrates that opioids, if appropriately titrated, do not generally result in terminal
sedation.
232.
Fohr, supra note 112, at 315-28.
233. Glajchen, supra note 16, at 214; Levy, supra note 7, at 1126.
234. Levy, supra note 7, at 1126.
235. Id. (citations omitted) (stating generally that dosage levels in cancer patients exceed
those of patients with chronic pain).
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level of pain and the efficacy of prior analgesic therapy. 36 Subsequent
drug therapy should be based on "a continuing assessment of the efficacy of
the therapy, with the dosage titrated upward as needed., 237 Because opioids
have no ceiling effect, the dose of pain medication can be increased until
pain relief is achieved or until the side effects of the medication become
intolerable.238 Clinicians note that sedation and cognitive impairment
typically can be managed by allowing time for tolerance to develop after
drug therapy is initiated or after the dose is escalated, and also by
combining the use of non-opioid, non-sedating drugs with the use of
opioids.239 Clinicians also recommend that opioids be administered at
regular intervals to prevent the recurrence of pain rather than administered
as needed by the patient. This practice reduces overall drug consumption
and minimizes the number of daily doses of medication. 240 The erroneous
belief that opioids cause terminal sedation makes health care providers
reluctant to prescribe, dispense, or administer narcotics for pain relief and
thus presents a barrier to the adequate management of pain with controlled
substances.
3. Philosophy of Medicine
In addition to the misconceptions surrounding opioid use, the
philosophical perspective of Western medicine unnecessarily perpetuates
the inadequate management of pain and the negative attitudes of health care
providers toward the use of opioids to treat pain.241 First, health care
providers place great weight in the objective approach to diagnosis. 242 This
approach ultimately fails because pain is subjective, not objective.243 In
order to assess pain, health care providers must rely on first-person reports

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Glajchen, supra note 16, at 214-15 (noting that side effects of narcotics in patients
with cancer or chronic pain include sedation, confusion, nausea, vomiting, and constipation,
the most common side effect among such patients).
239. Id. at 215 (noting that patients usually develop tolerance to these side effects within
one week to ten days of drug therapy); Levy, supranote 7, at 1128.
240. Glajchen, supra note 16, at 214 (stating that regular intervals reduce overall drug
consumption); Levy, supra note 7 (explaining that scheduled intervals minimize the number
of daily doses).
241. David B. Resnik et al., The Undertreatment of Pain: Scientific, Clinical, Cultural,
and PhilosophicalFactors, 4 MED. HEALTH CARE PHIL. 277, 282 (2001) (stating that the
philosophy behind modem medicine-the scientific approach to health and disease-plays a
key role in explaining why health care providers undertreat pain).
242. Id.
243. Id.at 278.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2004

37

Annals of Health
Law,of
Vol.Health
13 [2004],
Iss. 1, Art. 5
Annals
Law

[Vol. 13

from patients.24 4 The subjectivity of pain interferes with its incorporation
into modem medicine. Although health care providers are taught to talk to
patients about pain and include pain assessment in the initial exam and
health history, they tend to put greater weight on objective tests. 241 Chronic
non-malignant pain challenges this approach given that objective tests
cannot identify the source of this type of pain.
Second, the causal basis of pain is often poorly understood.246 Only
within the past thirty years has the health care community begun to
understand how the body perceives pain.*2447 When health care providers do
not know or understand the causal basis for a medical condition, they
frequently view the condition as not real.24 8 Doctors may treat patients'
reports of pain as imaginary, exaggerated, fraudulent, or merely
psychological.2 49
Third, health care providers view pain as a "mere" symptom of disease
rather than a separate phenomenon with a pathology of its own. As a result,
pain treatment may be given less emphasis in a patient's plan of care.25 °
Other treatment concerns, such as prolonging life and restoring health, may
be viewed as more important than pain management. With this mindset,
pain has traditionally not been studied in isolation. However, recently there
has been a focus on the comfort of patients, as evidenced by the increasing
number of pain specialists, pain centers, and palliative care.25 1
Fourth, there often are no "magic bullets" to alleviate pain. 2 Because
pain has psychological, social, cultural, and spiritual components, no magic
cure exists to eliminate pain. Pain control is a complex problem that
requires a multi-disciplinary approach. 3
Despite clinicians' best
intentions, pain and symptom control is often inadequate because the entire
healthcare system has been designed around the cure of disease rather than
palliation. 4 Fifth, pain does not fit the expert knowledge model. While

244.

Id. at 283.

245.
246.

Id.
Id. at 284.

247.
248.
249.

Resnick et al., supra note 241, at 279.
Id. at 284.
Id.at 278.

250. Id.
251.

MITCHELL MAX ET AL., AM. PAIN Soc'Y, TREATMENT OF PAIN AT THE END OF LIFE:

A POSITION STATEMENT FROM THE AMERICAN PAIN SOCIETY, at http://www.ampainsoc.org/

advocacy/treatment.htm.
252. Resnick et al., supra note 241, at 285.
253. Id.
254. MAX ET AL., supra note 251 (citing U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., AGENCY FOR HEALTH
CARE POLICY & RESEARCH, PUB. No. 94-0592, MANAGEMENT OF CANCER PAIN: CLINICAL
PRACTICE GUIDELINE No. 9 (1990)).
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health care providers are generally educated and trained to be experts on
medical issues, pain reverses the usual model of the doctor-patient
relationship by placing the knowledge and authority in the hands of
patients, not health care providers.255
For these reasons, the medical model results in negative attitudes on the
part of health care providers toward the use of opioids to treat pain, which
consequently results in the inadequate management of pain. Public policies
to improve the management of pain should allocate funds to medical,
pharmacy, and nursing schools for training and continuing education to
address these issues.25 6
4. Inadequate Education in the Areas of Pain Management
Inadequate education about pain management resulting in negative
attitudes about opioids is yet another factor that creates a barrier to pain
management. In a survey of 386 physicians in Texas, more than fifty
percent erroneously believed that drug addiction is a common result of the
legitimate prescription of controlled substances. 257 Further, approximately
one-third of the respondents incorrectly believed that increasing requests for
analgesics indicated tolerance to pain medication. They disagreed that
almost all cancer patients suffer pain and that almost all cancer patients
should receive opioids to relieve chronic pain.258
Inadequate knowledge about pain management is not limited to
physicians alone. 25 9 A study of 305 emergency room nurses reported that
forty-four percent of the time, inadequate knowledge of pain management
principles affected their practice in the emergency department. 260 Because
emergency room nurses screen and classify individuals in the emergency
room to determine the priority of treatment, and are often the first health
care providers to examine and/or interview a patient experiencing pain, the
knowledge base of emergency room nurses has a profound impact on an
emergency department's treatment of pain. The researchers found that the
emergency nurses did not understand the difference between physical
dependence, addiction, and tolerance.261 The researchers concluded that a
255. Resnick et al., supra note 241, at 285.
256. Id. See also infra Part IV.D.
257. Weinstein et al., supra note 219, at 485.
258. Id.
259. Tanabe & Buschmann, supra note 17, at 299-305 (stating that emergency room
nurses may not have a good understanding of the management of pain with drugs, or of
issues such as risk of addiction).
260. Id.at 303-04.
261. Id. at 304 (noting that only sixty-one percent of questions in this areas were
answered correctly).
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"[m]isunderstanding of these terms may lead emergency room nurses to be
overly concerned about addiction, which may lead to the undertreatment of
pain. ,,262
Health care providers who have an inadequate knowledge about the use
of controlled substances to manage pain are more reluctant to prescribe,
dispense, or administer opioids to manage pain. Accordingly, public
policies to improve the management of pain should include remedies to
address the inadequate knowledge of pain management. For example, the
receipt of federal money by professional schools and universities could be
contingent upon compliance with a requirement that they incorporate pain
management and the use of controlled substances to treat pain into their
curricula.263 Moreover, funds could be allocated to academic institutions
and professional schools for education about pain management.2 64 This
would ensure that future health care providers receive at least some
exposure to pain management early in their careers. Finally, DEA
registration to prescribe controlled substances could be made contingent on
continuing medical education in the use of controlled substances to manage
pain. 265
D. Reimbursement ForPain Management Is a Barrier
to Adequate Pain Management
In addition to education, the Medicare and Medicaid programs play a
critical role in pain relief in the United States. Since 1965, the federal
government has provided funding for health care through the Medicare and
Medicaid Programs. However, Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement
policies often impede pain management.266 Limited prescription drug
coverage, government investigations of physician diagnoses, and hospice
eligibility requirements prevent Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries from
accessing pain management services.

262. Id.
263. See infra Part IV.D.
264. See infra Part IV.D.
265. See infra Part IV.D.
266. This article touches upon the most significant reimbursement issues impacting pain
management in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. For a comprehensive discussion of
reimbursement issues related to pain management in the Medicare and Medicaid programs,
see Timothy Jost, Public Financing of Pain Management: Leaky Umbrellas and Ragged
Safety Nets, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 290, 291 (1998). For a discussion of managed care
reimbursement of pain management, see Dianne E. Hoffman, Pain Management and
Palliative Care in the Era of Managed Care: Issues for Health Insurers, 26 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 267, 267 (1998).
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1. Medicare Reimbursement
The Medicare program provides payment for services and medications
for almost all persons over the age of sixty-five, disabled persons under
sixty-five years of age, and persons with end-stage renal disease.2 67
Medicare Part A provides coverage for inpatient hospital care, 268 skilled
27osic
nursing facilities, 269 and hospice care27° whereas Medicare Part B generally
provides coverage for physician services.27 ' Medicare also reimburses
medication injections,27 2 infusion
providers for services such as pain
274
273
pumps, and electrical stimulation.

267. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2000).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(1) (2000) (providing coverage for inpatient hospital care "up
to 150 days during any spell of illness minus 1 day for each day of such services in excess of
90 received during any preceding spell of illness."). Inpatient hospital coverage includes
drugs, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(b)(2) (2000), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(2) (West 2003), 42 C.F.R. §
409.1 0(a)(5) (2003), but a hospital admission solely for the purpose of administering a drug
which has not been determined "reasonably necessary" is not covered. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVS. (CMS), DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (DHHS), MEDICARE
INTERMEDIARY

MANUAL

§ 3101.3, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals (last

modified Nov. 26, 2003). However, Medicare provides payment for four weeks of inpatient

hospitalization for pain rehabilitation. CMS, DHHS, COVERAGE ISSUES MANUAL § 35-21
[hereinafter CMS COVERAGE ISSUES MANUAL], available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/

manuals (last modified Nov. 26, 2003). Additionally, Medicare will provide payment for an
outpatient hospital pain rehabilitation program provided that the patient's pain is attributable
to a physical cause, the usual methods of treatment have not been successful in alleviating
the pain, and a significant loss of ability by the patient to function independently has resulted
from the pain. Id. at § 35-21.1.
269. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(2) (providing coverage for up to 100 days of during any spell
of illness post-hospital extended care services). See § 1395x(i) (defining post-hospital
extended care and services).
270. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(d) (explaining hospice care election and waiver of rights).
271. 42 U.S.C. § 1395k(a)(2)(B) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 410.10 (2003). See also 42
U.S.C.A. § 1395k(a)(2)(B) (West 2003).
272. Medicare Part B covers drugs that are administered incidental to a physician's
professional services that cannot be self-administered and that are commonly furnished in a
physician's office or clinic without charge or included in a physician's bill. 42 C.F.R. §
410.26 (2003). Generally, injections satisfy this requirement. Injections are not covered,
however, if standard medical practice indicates that the administration of the medication by
mouth is effective and is an accepted or preferred method of administration. CMS
COVERAGE ISSUES MANUAL, supra note 268, at § 2049.2.
273. Jost, supra note 266, at 292. Infusion pumps are covered under the durable medical
equipment benefit.
42 C.F.R. § 410.38 (2003).
274. 42 C.F.R. § 410.38(f). A transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation ("TENS") is a
type of electrical nerve stimulator that is attached to the surface of the patient's skin over the
peripheral nerve to be stimulated. CMS COVERAGE ISSUES MANUAL, supra note 268, at § 6020. Medicare pays for a TENS unit that is determined to medical necessary and that is
ordered by the beneficiary's physician or a specialty physician on referral from the
beneficiary's physician and the written order is furnished to the supplier before the delivery
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In addition, Medicare Part B provides coverage for medication supplied
incidental to a physician's professional services and for those drugs that
cannot be self-administered.27 5 However, Medicare does not provide
payment, for oral medication in an outpatient setting, including pain
medication that is supplied pursuant to a physician's prescription.2 76
of the unit to the beneficiary. 42 C.F.R. § 410.38(f)(1), (2). See also CMS COVERAGE ISSUE
MANUAL, supra note 268, at § 45-19 (identifying requirements for transcutaneous electrical
nerve stimulation for acute post-operative pain); id. at § 60-20 (explaining coverage of
TENS for chronic pain under the durable equipment benefit).
275. 42 U.S.C. § 1395k(a)(2)(B) (providing Medicare Part B coverage for medical and
other health services); 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s)(2) (defining "medical and other health services"
to include drugs which are not usually self-administered by the patient); 42 C.F.R. § 410.26
(explaining Medicare Part B coverage for drugs); CMS, DHHS, MEDICARE CARRIERS
MANUAL § 2049, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals (last modified Nov. 26,
2003).
276. On November 25, 2003, after months of contentious negotiations between House
and Senate conferees, Congress approved a bill that will assist Medicare beneficiaries to pay
for the costs of outpatient prescription drugs. See Congress Approves Drug Benefit Bill,
Sending Legislation to President Bush, BNA HEALTH PLAN & PROVIDER REP. (BNA, Inc.,
Washington, D.C.), Dec. 3, 2003, at 1223 [hereinafter BNA Report]. See also Medicare
Prescription Drug, Modernization and Improvement Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173,
available at http://thomas.loc.gov. Although the drug benefit will begin in 2006, a
prescription drug discount card will be made available beginning the spring of 2004. BNA
Report at 1223. The bill is estimated to cost $395 million over the next 10 years. Id. The
full drug benefit will require beneficiaries to pay an estimated $35 monthly premium and a
$250 annual deductible for the drug benefit. Id.
Prior to this bill, signed by President George W. Bush on December 8, 2003, Medicare Part
B did not provide payment or medication in an outpatient setting. See Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173 (2003). Thus,
prior to this Act, where a physician gave a patient pills or other oral medication, such
medication was excluded from coverage since the form of the drug given to the patient was
usually self-administered. See CMS COVERAGE ISSUES MANUAL, supra note 268, at §
2049.2. In addition, oral drugs incident to physician services were considered selfadministered and, thus, were not covered under Medicare Part B. Id. at § 2049.2. See also
42 C.F.R. § 410.27 (2003).
In 1988 and 1994, initial congressional attempts to provide a Medicare prescription benefit
failed. See, e.g., The Medicare Catastrophic Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat.
683, repealed by Medicare Catastrophic Repeal Act of 1989, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 101-234;
American Health Security Act of 1994, H.R. 3960, 103rd Cong. (1994). A few years later,
the 106th Congress introduced several bills that proposed to provide a Medicare prescription
drug benefit. See, e.g., Seniors Prescription Insurance Coverage Equity (SPICE) Act of
1999, H.R. 2782, S. 1480, 106th Cong. (1999). See also Amy J. Dilcher, Congress Proposes
to Expand Medicare to Include Coverage for Outpatient Prescription Drugs, at
www.law.uh.edu/healthlawperspectives/Medicare/20000518Congress.html
(summarizing
prescription drug legislation). In the 107th Congressional session, Congress introduced at
least twenty-three bills that would have provided a Medicare prescription benefit or
addressed Medicare's lack of coverage for prescription drugs by alternative means. None of
these bills passed. Although The Medicare Modernization and Prescription Act of 2002,
which proposed to provide a voluntary prescription drug coverage under the Medicare
program, passed in the House, it ultimately died in the Senate. See The Medicare
Modernization and Prescription Act, H.R. 4954, 107th Cong. (2002).
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Consequently, Medicare beneficiaries can be admitted to a hospital, skilled
nursing facility, or hospice, and receive Medicare coverage for care that
may cost thousands of dollars; however, the program will not cover a
patient's monthly prescription costs for oral pain medication, which may
amount to several hundred dollars every month. The high cost of oral pain
medication is necessarily a problem for elderly persons on fixed incomes
who have several prescriptions. In 1996, for example, the average annual
out-of-pocket expense for medication per elderly person was $405, a
ninety-one percent increase in comparison to 1987.277 When seniors with
limited budgets must decide which prescriptions to fill, they are more likely
to fill their prescriptions for blood pressure or diabetes medication, rather
than medicine for pain relief, which may they consider non-essential
medication. As such, Medicare's reimbursement policy for oral medication
impedes pain management for Medicare beneficiaries who are suffering in
pain and who are not in settings in which pain medication is reimbursed by
Medicare.
Medicare Part A also provides coverage for hospice services. 278 In 2001,
the total number of hospice users was 579,801.279 Hospice benefits provide
for the management of terminal illness and related conditions, including
pain relief. To qualify for hospice benefits, a beneficiary must be
considered "terminally ill" and must voluntarily elect hospice care.280 A
beneficiary is considered "terminally ill" if a physician certifies that the
beneficiary has a life expectancy of six months or less.28' Once a
beneficiary elects hospice care, the individual must waive the right to
Medicare payment for all curative treatment for the terminal illness and
related conditions.2 82 In return, the patient is eligible for a variety of

277.

DHHS, HEALTH AND INJURY CHARTBOOK, at 12 & tbl. 119 (2001). A recent study

by the Commonwealth Fund found that the average Medicare enrollee in Medicare+Choice
plan (Medicare's private plan option) will spend approximately $512 in out-of-pocket
expenses for prescription drugs in 2003. Cf Marsha Gold & Lori Achman, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND, ISSUE BRIEF No. 667, AVERAGE OUT-OF-POCKET HEALTH CARE
COSTS FOR MEDICARE+CHOICE ENROLLESS INCREASE 10 PERCENT IN 2000 (Aug. 2003)

(noting the increase in out-of-pocket expenses from 1999-2003), at http://www.cmwf.org/
programs/medfutur/gold-averageoopcosts-ib 667.pdf.
278. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(4) (2000) (explaining scope of benefits).
279. HOSPICE ASS'N OF AM., HOSPICE FACTS & STATISTICS 1 (Nov. 2002) (citing CMS,
OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, CTR. FOR HEALTH PLANS & PROVIDERS (Oct. 2002), available at

http:www.nahc.org/Consumer/hpcstats.html.
280. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(d).
281. 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b) (2003); 42 C.F.R. § 418.20 (2003) (describing election
periods); 42 C.F.R. § 418.22 (providing requirements for certification of terminal illness).
282. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(d)(2)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 418.24(d) (2003) (stating that election for
hospice benefit requires waiver of all other Medicare benefits). The individual may revoke
the election at any time. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(d)(B)(i); 42 C.F.R. § 418.28(a) (2003).
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palliative care services. 283 Many experts suggest that access to hospice care
under Medicare is limited and that enrollment in hospice often occurs too
late.284 From 1992 to 2002, for instance, the number of hospice patients
dying within one week of admission increased from twenty-one percent to
thirty percent.285 Consequently, the data suggest that patients are not
receiving the totality of an important Medicare benefit - at least six months
of hospice services - that Congress intended the terminally ill to receive.
In a 2002 report to Congress, the Medicare Payment Commission
("MedPac") concluded that the difficulty in predicting the course of illness,
even with today's advanced technology, causes late enrollment in hospice
programs.2 86 Research suggests that only twenty percent of prognoses of
terminal illness were accurate and sixty-three percent overestimated the
survival time of beneficiaries. 287 Given the difficulty in predicting a
patient's death, most patients referred to hospice die within only three
weeks of their admission to a hospice. 288 Recognizing this, Congress

283. 42 C.F.R. § 418.202 (2003). Covered hospice services include nursing care,
medical social services, physicians' services, counseling, home health aid services, physical,
occupational, and speech therapy. Id.
284. See generally David E. Joranson, Are Health-Care Reimbursement Policies a
Barrierto Acute and Cancer Pain Management?, 9 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 244 (1994),
available at http://www.medsch.wisc.edu/painpolicy/publicat/94jpsma.htm.
Short-term
admissions result in increased health care costs to the hospice. Id.
285.

MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM., MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES'

HOSPICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, at 6 (May

ACCESS TO

2002). A delay in admission to hospice care

has serious implications. For instance, patients in the last six months of life are likely to
need pain management services, particularly those with terminal illness. Beneficiaries who
remain in environments other than the hospice setting (for example, community, skilled
nursing facilities, home health agencies) often do not receive appropriate management of
pain because the focus in those systems is on providing curative treatment as compared to
palliative care in hospice settings. Since beneficiaries who elect the hospice benefit must
waive payment for all curative treatment, hospices are in the unique position to be able to
focus solely on the comfort level of the patients in their dying days.
286. Id. (concluding that one of the main causes of late referrals to hospice included the
difficulty of making prognoses of death within six months).
287. Id.
288. Jost, supra note 266, at 294 (citations omitted). Professor Jost suggests that the
declining length of stay is a result of several factors. Increased pressure is being placed on
doctors to refrain from referring patients to hospices until death is almost certain. Id.
Additionally, Medicare hospital reimbursement, "which both discourages hospitals from
admitting patients until their condition is grave and encourages hospitals to discharge
patients as rapidly as possible, making it tempting for discharge planners to make a quick
home health referral rather than a more time-consuming hospice referral." Id. Further,
advances in technology often permit patients to remain in the community with symptoms
controlled for a much longer time than previously, followed by a swift death when
treatments finally fail. Id. Finally, other Medicare providers such as SNFs and home health
agencies, may be reluctant to refer patients to hospices until the patient is in the final stages
of dying because the hospice benefit is exclusive of other Medicare services. Id.
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recently amended the Social Security Act to clarify that the certification of a
terminal illness "shall be based on the physician's or medical director's
clinical judgment regarding the normal course of the individual's
judgment., 289 According to MedPac, additional time may be required for
the health care industry to familiarize itself with this standard and apply
9
it.2 0

Another reason for delayed admissions to hospice care is physicians'
concern with investigations into Medicare certifications for patients who
29
did not expire as early as predicted. ' Investigative agencies such as the
Office of Inspector General ("OIG") have conducted retrospective reviews
of terminal illness certifications.2 92 Federal government audits of hospice
certifications deter physicians from making referrals to hospice at the
appropriate time293 because physicians do not wish to trigger OIG scrutiny
of their medical practice (with potential charges, including Medicare fraud,
at issue).29 4 Accordingly, these investigations substitute retrospective
governmental scrutiny for medical judgment and are thus a barrier to the
adequate management of pain.
Medicare payment rates for hospice services are yet another barrier to
adequate pain management. Hospice services for both Medicare and
Medicaid are paid on four prospective per diem rates, with each rate
determined by the level of service and whether it is provided on an inpatient
or outpatient basis. 295 While beneficiaries are not precluded from receiving

289. Benefits Improvement and Protection Act (BIPA) of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (amending § 1814(a)(7) of the Social Security Act, Subtitle C, § 322).
290. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 285, at 7.
291. Jost, supra note 266, at 295-95.
292. Jost, supra note 266, at 295. See also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. (OIG),

DHHS, PUB. No. A-05-97-00015, OIG AUDIT, BENEFICIARY HOSPICE ELIGIBILITY AT
SAMARITAN CARE, INC., SOUTHFIELD, MICHIGAN, (Sept. 11, 1998), available at http://

oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region5/5970015.pdf; OIG, DHHS, PUB. No. A-02-94-01030, OIG

EL HOGAR DE MANATI
AUDIT, REVIEW OF HOSPICE BENEFICIARY ELIGIBILITY AT HoSPICIO2 EN
4
(June 9, 1995), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region2/ 9 01030.pdf.

293.

See, e.g., OIG, DHHS, PUB. No. A-04-95-021 1, OIG AUDIT, OPERATION RESTORE

INC.
TRUST, REVIEW OF HOSPICE ELIGIBILITY AT THE HOSPICE OF THE FLORIDA SLUNCOAST,
4 49 00 2

11 .pdf
http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region /
at
available
1996),
(Aug.
OIG
the
who
beneficiaries
to
relating
million
$8.9
of
recoupment
(recommending
determined were not eligible for Medicare hospice benefits). The Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) (now the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) subsequently
agreed to reassess the OIG's findings. HCFA, DHHS, MANAGEMENT REPORT ON FINAL
ACTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999, SECTION VI (1999), available at http://www.hhs.gov/of/

6
6
reports/accountlacct99/sect /sect 5.html; HCFA, DHHS, MANAGEMENT REPORT ON FINAL
ACTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000 (2000), available at http://www.hhs.gov/of/reports/account/
acct00/sect6/sect6b.html.

294.
295.

Jost, supra note 266, at 295.
42 U.S.C. § 1395f(i) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 418.302-0.309 (2003).
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hospice services in excess of six months, the hospice benefit is capped at a
specific amount each year regardless of the services provided.296 In 1997,
the OIG found that hospice patients residing in nursing homes received
fewer services than similar patients who received hospice services in their
homes, even though the reimbursement rates for both types of patients were
the same.297 While hospice payment rates are adjusted for inflation
annually, the rates are based on information from a Medicare demonstration
project completed in the early 1980s and are thus inconsistent with the costs
that efficient hospices incur in furnishing care to patients.29 8 In its report to
Congress, MedPac recommended evaluating hospice payment rates to
ensure that they are consistent with the costs of providing appropriate
299
care.

2. Medicaid Reimbursement
In addition to Medicare, a major payer of services, Medicaid is a joint
federal and state program also providing coverage for pain management. 300
The Medicaid program provides coverage for health-related services for the
poor and for individuals over the age of sixty-five who are dually eligible
for Medicaid. 30 Because Medicaid is run by the states, Medicaid coverage
policies for pain management differ from state to state. In general,

U.S.C.A. § 195f(i) (West 2003).
296. For fiscal year ending October 31, 2001, the hospice cap amount was $16,650.85.
See Palmetto GBA, Change in Hospice Payment Rates, Update to the Hospice Cap, Revised
Hospice Wage Index and Hospice Pricer, available at http://www.palmettogba.com;
Memorandum from Thomas E. Hamilton, CMS Director of the Disabled and Elderly Health
Programs Group, to all Associate Regional Administrators of the Division of Medicaid and
State Operations 1-2 (date not provided) (establishing Medicare payment rates for FY 2002).
Section 1814(i)(1)(C)(ii) of the Social Security Act provides for an annual increase in the
payment rates for hospice care services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395f Section 1814(i)(2)(B) of
the Act provides for an annual increase or decrease in the hospice cap amount. See 42
U.S.C. § 1395f. Should a beneficiary receive hospice services that exceed the capped
amount, Medicare will not pay additional hospice services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395f. For FY
2001, the average number of hospice days utilized was 49.9 days per client. See HOSPICE
ASS'N OF AM., supra note 279.
297. OIG, DHHS, PUB. No. OEI-05-95-00250, HOSPICE PATIENTS IN NURSING HOMES
(Sept. 1997), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-95-00250.pdf According to
its FY 2003 work plan, the OIG plans to follow up its examination of the financial
implications of Medicare hospice payments for nursing home residents. See OIG, DHHS,
OIG WORK PLAN 2003, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/workplan/2003/
2cms%20FY03.pdf
298. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 285, at 7.
299. Id. at 8.
300. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2000). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (West 2003).
301. Dual eligibility means that the beneficiary is eligible to receive benefits under both
the Medicare and Medicaid programs. See www.cms.hhs.gov/dualeligibles/bbadadef asp.
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3 °2
outpatient care, 303
Medicaid provides coverage for inpatient services,
skilled nursing facility care,3 °4 and physician services.30 5
The most significant Medicaid issue is prescription drug coverage.
Medicaid has historically filled the gap in Medicare's lack of a prescription
30 6 Medicaid
drug benefit by providing coverage for drugs to beneficiaries.
has also played a "key role" in bridging the gaps in Medicare for those
30 7
beneficiaries who are dually eligible under both government programs.
However, the Medicaid statute allows states to impose copayments on
beneficiaries to limit coverage.30 8 Studies have shown that copayments of
as little as one dollar per prescription have led to a five to ten 30percent
drugs. 9
decline in drug use, including both essential and nonessential
Federal law also permits states to limit the minimum or maximum
quantities per prescription or the maximum number of refills of the
medication.3 10 As of 1998, approximately half of the states imposed limits
on the quantity of drugs that could be dispensed and/or the number of refills
per prescriptions.3 11 More significantly, eight states limited the number of
prescription refills a recipient may obtain in one month, while other states
limit the number of dispensing fees that a pharmacist could receive in a
312 Because pain
month for filling a particular recipient's prescriptions.
patients often require frequent dosages of medication - upwards of thirty 3to13
management.
fifty pills a day - these limitations are likely to impede pain
Attempts to limit Medicaid coverage of pain medication through restrictions
on the quantity of drugs have an adverse effect on pain management
and are left
because patients are unable to obtain the medication they need
314
pain.
in
suffer
to
or
payment
of
source
to find either another

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

42 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C.

§ 1396d(a)(l) (2000). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)(1) (West 2003).
§ 1396d(a)(2). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)(2).
§ 1396d(a)(4). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)(4).
§ 1396d(a)(5). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)(5).

KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., A PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT IN MEDICARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICAID AND
LOW-INCOME MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES 2 (Sept. 2003).

307. ld. at 1.
308. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(a)(2), (3) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 447.53-54 (2003) (providing that
services cannot be denied to a recipient who is unable to pay a copayment); 42 U.S.C. §
1396o(e). As of 1998, twenty-seven states imposed copayments on prescriptions, which
ranged from $0.50 to $3.00 per prescription. Jost, supra note 266, at 297.
309. Jost, supra note 266, at 297.
310. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(a)(2), (3); 42 C.F.R. § 447.53-.54 (2003).
311. Jost, supra note 266, at 297.
312. Id.
313. Id.; JORANSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 495.
314. Jost, supranote 266, at 297.
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Because the Medicare and/or Medicaid programs may limit the ability of
patients to access controlled substances or hospice services for pain relief,
the programs are barriers to pain management. Any policy that purports to
improve pain management should: (1) eliminate the Medicare requirement
that a physician certify that an individual has six months or less to live and
require that physicians certify terminal illness by another standard to be
determined by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services with input from
physicians; (2) provide a safe harbor from federal and state fraud
investigations for health care providers and institutions who, in good faith,
certify Medicare beneficiaries for hospice services; (3) establish a
requirement that OIG audits of hospice care eligibility determinations are
performed by physicians who specialize in patients with terminal illness;
(4) address Medicare payment rates for hospice services; and (5) prohibit
states from placing limitations on the quantity of prescription drugs
dispensed to Medicaid beneficiaries.
E. Civil Liabilityfor the Undertreatmentof Pain
While there are a multitude of barriers that impede adequate pain
management, until recently, there were no external incentives for providers
to treat pain. Traditionally, state medical boards have declined to pursue
disciplinary actions against health care providers for the undertreatment of
pain. For example, the family of an elderly man who died of lung cancer
filed a complaint with the Medical Board of California against a physician
3 5
for failing to prescribe adequate pain medication prior to his death.
While the Board's medical consultant agreed that "the pain care was indeed
inadequate," it concluded that, "there is insufficient evidence at this time to
warrant pursing further action. 3 16 The family subsequently filed a lawsuit
in California state court asserting medical malpractice and elder abuse.3 17
Today, however, the threat of civil liability is emerging as an incentive
for providers to treat pain. While there are only a few cases alleging the
undertreatment of pain as the basis for a medical malpractice claim, two
recent cases indicate that these actions may be on the rise. While health

315.
ABUSE

COMPASSION IN DYING FED'N, UNDERTREATING PAIN CAN AMOUNT TO ELDER

(Feb.

3,

2000),

available at

http://www.compassionindying.org/releases/

elderabuse.html; Susan Okie, Doctor's Duty to Ease Pain at Issue in CaliforniaLawsuit,

POST, May 8, 2001, at A3, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/health/A51818-2001May6.html.
For a description of this case, see infra text
accompanying notes 330-53.
316. Okie, supra note 315, at A3.
317. Bergman v. Eden Med. Ctr., No. H205732-1 (Alameda County Ct. filed June 13,
2002). See also Barry R. Furrow, Pain Management and Provider Liability: No More
Excuses, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 28, 28 (2001).
WASH.
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care providers may need an incentive to provide pain medicine, in the
current system these providers are placed in a difficult position where both
the treatment and the overtreatment of pain may result in penalties. If they
prescribe pain medication to treat pain, they are subjecting themselves to
potential disciplinary or criminal actions. Under controlled substance laws,
there is clearly an incentive to avoid prescribing narcotics for pain relief,
including the potential for a reprimand, fines, suspension or revocation of
the professional licenses, criminal penalties, jail time, and loss of liberty.
However, if providers do not prescribe controlled substances, they may now
face administrative disciplinary actions by state medical boards, civil
actions for the undertreatment of pain, malpractice awards, increased
insurance costs, and publication of such information on databases available
to various health care entities and the public. The physician is forced to
choose between the lesser of two evils, notwithstanding his or her wishes to
provide relief from pain.
An Oregon case, the only instance to date in which a state medical board
disciplined a health care provider for under-prescribing pain medication,
may signal a shift in attitudes toward imposing liability for undertreating
pain. In September 1999, the Oregon Board of Medical Examiners cited
Dr. Paul Bilder, a fifty-four year old pulmonary specialist, for
unprofessional or dishonorable conduct and gross or repeated acts of
negligence for failing to adequately treat six seriously ill or dying patients
with pain medication from 1993 to 1998.318 In at least three of the cases,
Dr. Bilder purportedly failed to prescribe controlled substances for pain
relief for fear that pain medication would suppress the respiratory drive of
his patients despite medical research reflecting appropriate titration of
319 In one case,
controlled substances does not depress patient respirations.
for example, Dr. Bilder refused to prescribe sedatives for a thirty-five year
old woman with pulmonary disease and instead prescribed a paralytic agent,
32 °
which relaxes the breathing muscles to accommodate the breathing tube.
Dr. Bilder refused to prescribe pain medications or sedatives later that day

318. See Or. Bd. of Med. Examiners, Guide to Licensing Action Report (Aug. 14, 2003),
available at www.bme.state.or.us/licensactionrpt.htmil (lists legal actions that have been
taken by the Oregon Board of Medical Examiners). See also Erin Hoover Barnett, Case
Marks Big Shift in Pain Policy, OREGONIAN, Sept. 2, 1999. Oregon's disciplinary action
against Dr. Bilder comes more than one and a half years after a national nonprofit patient
advocacy group, Compassion in Dying, called upon all fifty states medical boards and the
Federation of State Medical Boards to penalize physicians who failed to give adequate pain
control to terminally ill patients. Medical Boards Urged to Penalize Docs Who Give Little
Pain Relief to Dying, MED. & HEALTH, Jan. 19, 1998, available at 1998 WL 10321284.

319.
320.

Bamett, supra note 318.
Id.
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when the patient became restless and fought the ventilator.32' When the
woman subsequently pulled out her breathing tube, Dr. Bilder failed to
respond to requests to re-intubate the patient. 2 While the Board did not
suspend or revoke Dr. Bilder's license to practice medicine, it required him
to complete a one-year program in which another pulmonary specialist
worked with him to assess his practice and make improvements; it also
required him to attend a continuing medical education course on physicianpatient communication and to meet with a psychiatrist who would give
regular reports to the Board for at least one year.323
Dr. Bilder's case demonstrates the extent to which providers' lack of
knowledge about the appropriate use of narcotics to manage pain may
negatively impact their use of narcotics to relieve pain or discomfort.
Further, Dr. Bilder's story sends a message to providers that state medical
boards may impose sanctions, pursuant to administrative actions, for
undertreating pain. Accordingly, both the treatment and undertreatment of
pain may prospectively result in penalties and the loss of external rewards
(i.e., loss or suspension of license, fines, etc.). Nevertheless, health care
providers may continue to perceive the potential penalties for
undertreatment by medical boards less onerous than those penalties
imposed when a provider overtreats, given that Oregon's medical board did
not suspend or revoke Dr. Bilder's medical license but merely imposed
continuing medical education, physician mentoring, and psychiatric visits.
Accordingly, providers may continue to undertreat pain.
Aside from disciplinary actions, two other cases illustrate the potential
civil penalties that providers may face for undertreating pain. In Estate of
Henry James v. Hillhaven, a 1990 case, the court found a health care
provider liable for failing to treat pain appropriately.32 4 Mr. James was
admitted to Hillhaven nursing home with less than six months to live as a
result of prostate cancer that had metastasized to his left femur and spine.
Although a physician had ordered doses of oral morphine elixir every three
hours as needed for pain, a Hillhaven nurse, based on her assessment that
Mr. James was "addicted to morphine," substituted a mild tranquilizer and
delayed or withheld altogether the administration of the oral morphine

321. Id.
322. Id. An on-call physician eventually reinserted the breathing tube.
323. Or. Bd. of Med. Examiners, supra note 318 available at www.bme.state.or.us;
Barnett, supranote 318.
324. Robyn S. Shapiro, Health Care Providers' Liability Exposure for Inappropriate
Pain Management, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHics 360, 361 (1996) (describing the unreported
decision of Estate of Henry James v. Hillhaven Corp., No. 89CVS64 (Super. Ct. Div. N.C.
Nov. 20, 1990)).
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325

without the physician's authorization.
Mr. James' family filed a lawsuit alleging that the failure of the nurse
and the nursing home to ensure the proper administration of pain
medication in appropriate doses caused Mr. James to experience "inhuman
treatment" inflicted "without regard to the consequences and without care
as to whether or not the patient received analgesic relief and without care
32 6
During
that the result and procedures were torture of the human flesh.
of
standard
the trial, medical and nursing experts testified about the proper
care for the administration of opioid analgesics and specifically about the
327 In addition,
administration of morphine for the relief of intractable pain.
a nurse specializing in quality assurance for nursing homes testified that
health care institutions have an obligation to ensure that their health care
providers properly manage pain.328 The jury awarded fifteen million dollars
in damages to the family of Mr. James, which was subsequently resolved by
settlement among the parties in an undisclosed amount. In his summary
statement approving the settlement, Judge Grant reiterated that Mr. James'
family "does not allege that the conduct of the defendants caused the death
conduct of the defendants caused [him]
of [Mr. James], but only that the
329
suffering[.],,
and
pain
increased
It was not until eleven years after Hillhaven that a jury found another
health care provider liable for the undertreatment of pain. Bergman v. Eden
Medical Center is the first case in which a physician was held liable for
elder abuse under California's Bill of Patient's Rights for the
undertreatment of pain based on the physician's failure to prescribe
sufficient medication for a terminally ill patient. 330 William Bergman,
eighty-five years old, presented to Eden Medical Center in Northern
331
Mr. Bergman had
California with complaints of severe back pain.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Bergman v. Eden Med. Ctr., No. H205732-1 (Alameda County Ct. filed June 13,
2000). Dr. Chin was not the first physician sued under the California Elder Abuse Act for
inadequate treatment. In May 2000, a physician at a nursing home was found liable for elder
abuse for concealing a patient's bedsore, opposing her hospitalization when it was medically
necessary, and then withdrawing from her case shortly before her death. Mack v. Soung, 95
Cal. Rptr. 2d 830, 835-36 (Ct. App. 2000). Like Bergman, the case was premised on the fact
that the California Elder Abuse Act covers the failure to provide medical care for health
needs. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.57 (West 2003).
331. Okie, supra note 315, at A3. See Matthew Yi, Doctor Found Reckless for Not
Relieving Pain, $1.5 Million Jury Verdictfor Family of Cancer Patient Who Went Home to
Haywardto Die, S.F. CHRON., June 14, 2001. See also Janice Lynch, Will CaliforniaCourt
Find Elder Abuse in Case of InadequatePain Management?, at http://ww.mywhatever.com/

Published by LAW eCommons, 2004

51

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 13 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 5

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 13

recently lost weight and had been suffering pain from a compression
fracture of a spinal bone; a chest x-ray also revealed possible lung cancer.332
Dr. Wing Chin, an internal medicine specialist who had not previously
treated Bergman, admitted him to the hospital for tests and prescribed
intravenous Demerol, a narcotic for pain, to be given in twenty-five to fifty
milligram doses as needed.333
Nurses at the hospital periodically asked Mr. Bergman to rate his pain on
a scale of one to ten and recorded his responses. All of the ratings in Mr.
Bergman's medical chart ranged from seven to ten, corresponding with
moderate to severe pain. However, progress notes recorded at other times
by Dr. Chin and respiratory therapists indicated that Mr. Bergman said he
"felt okay" or that his back pain was tolerable.334 Mr. Bergman underwent
a procedure to obtain lung tissue-although not definitive, the results were
suggestive of lung cancer. Subsequently, Mr. Bergman chose to forego
treatment for lung cancer and returned home from the hospital for palliative
care. 335 Upon discharge, Mr. Bergman rated his pain a ten for which Dr.
Chin prescribed Vicodin tablets, even though Mr. Bergman could not
swallow pills and even though this medication had been ineffective for his
back pain on previous occasions.336 Mr. Bergman's daughter complained
that her father required stronger pain medication; accordingly, Dr. Chin
ordered a single injection of Demerol and a slow-release patch containing
fentanyl, a narcotic.3 37 After three days at home, a hospice nurse assessed
Mr. Bergman's pain at level ten and called Dr. Chin to ask him to prescribe
liquid morphine.338 According to court records, Dr. Chin did not prescribe
the morphine. 339 Later that afternoon, a doctor who had previously treated
Mr. Bergman prescribed a single dose of morphine, which brought him
immediate relief. Mr. Bergman died the next day.34 °
Mr. Bergman's family sued both Eden Medical Center and Dr. Chin
alleging violation of California's Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil
Protection Act Remedies, which allows patients to ask for painkillers of

cifwriter/content/19/abcdl592.html; James Hattori, Doctor Found Guilty of Elder Abuse
(June 12, 2001), available at http://www.cnnsf.com/storyofweek.html.
332. Okie, supra note 315, at A3.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Okie, supranote 315, at A3.
339. Id.
340. Id.
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their choice. 341 The act provides that "abuse" of an elder includes
"neglect," which is defined to include the failure to provide medical care for
It allows for both criminal
physical and mental health needs.342
344
343
and civil suits against those accused of elder abuse. It
prosecutions
also allows a victim's family to bring a lawsuit, even after the victim's
death. 345 Because California's malpractice laws do not allow pain and
suffering for the deceased, Mr. Bergman's family brought a lawsuit for
elder abuse.346
The jury found Dr. Chin liable for elder abuse and reckless negligence by
not giving Mr. Bergman enough pain medication. Although the jury
awarded Mr. Bergman's family $1.5 million in general damages, it did not
find that Dr. Chin acted with malice or that he had intentionally caused
emotional distress that would have supported an award of punitive
damages.347 Subsequently, the trial judge reduced the $1.5 million damages
to $250,000, applying California's medical malpractice cap,348
notwithstanding that the case had been characterized as one of abuse rather
than malpractice. In April 2002, Judge Robert Hunter of the Superior Court
of California for Alameda County denied defense motions to set aside the
verdict and demand a new trial. The court also awarded attorney's fees to
the
fee award to emphasize the
the plaintiff and applied a 1.5 multiplier to 34
9
interest.
public
the
to
case
the
of
importance
The Bergman decision has had a tremendous impact on the management
Reacting to the case, California passed
of pain in California. 350
351
legislation requiring physicians to complete continuing medical education
every four years. As stated by Dr. Russell Portenoy, former president of the
American Pain Society and head of the pain management department of
Beth Israel Medical Center in New York City, the Bergman case also sends
a wake-up call to physicians that there are potential civil penalties for
undertreating pain: "[i]t begins to create the reality of (punishment)... for

341.
342.
343.
344.

CAL.
CAL.
CAL.
CAL.
CAL.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 15600-15675
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 15610.57.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 15656.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657-15657.3.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657.3(c)-(d).

(West 2001).

345.
346. Lynch, supra note 331; Hattori, supra note 331.
347. Yi, szapra note 331; Matthew Yi, Elder Abuse Verdict Challenges Physicians on
Pain: Doctors Must Balance ReliefAgainst Addiction, S.F. CHRON., June 15, 2001.
348. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 2001).
349. Yi, supra note 331; Hattori, supra note 331.
350. Yi, supra note 331; Hattori, supra note 331.
351. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2190 (West 2002) (codifying Bill AB 487, which was
enacted Jan. 1, 2002).
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' 352
physicians who don't respond to patients who have severe pain.
Professor Barry Furrow suggests that cases similar to Hillhaven and
Bergman are likely to continue and even increase in the near future given
the number of "politically savvy aging babyboomers with lower back pain,"
the sound scientific evidence for the proper assessment of pain, and the
proliferation of practice management guidelines.35 3 Furrow and other
scholars have proposed that pain management guidelines may be utilized as
a tool by plaintiffs attorneys to establish the standard of care for pain
management.354 Practice guidelines are standardized suggestions based on
a consensus of current medical research about how to treat a particular
medical condition. These guidelines assist health care providers and guide
patient decisions about managing a particular condition.35 5
Prior to and including the time of the Hillhaven case, practice guidelines
for the management of pain did not exist, which would explain the absence
of other undertreatment cases. Proving negligent pain management has
been difficult for plaintiffs given the failure of the medical profession to
implement pain management standards. In 1992, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
("AHCPR") released its Acute Pain Management Guidelines, and in 1994,
it released its Cancer Pain Management Guidelines. 6 Other groups have
since released guidelines for the management of different types of pain,
including peri-operative pain,357 low back pain,358 and acute and chronic
pain in sickle cell disease. 359 The Agency for Health Care Policy and
Research has also issued guidelines for a variety of patient groups,
362
361
including injured workers, 360 the elderly, and long-term care residents.

352.
353.
354.
355.

Yi, supra note 331.
Furrow, supranote 317, at 30.
Shapiro, supra note 324, at 362; Furrow, supra note 317, at 31.
Furrow, supranote 317, at 31.

356.
AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY & RESEARCH, DHHS, PUB. No. 92-0032,
ACUTE PAIN MANAGEMENT: OPERATIVE OR MEDICAL PROCEDURES & TRAUMA, CLINICAL
PRACTICE GUIDELINE (1992); AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY & RESEARCH, DHHS, PUB.
No. 94-0592, MANAGEMENT OF CANCER PAIN, CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINE (1994).

357. AM. SOC'Y OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR ACUTE PAIN
MANAGEMENT IN THE PERIOPERATIVE SETTING (1995), at http//:www.asahq.org/publications/
AndServices/pain.html.
358.

INST. FOR CLINICAL SYS. IMPROVEMENTS, ADULT Low BACK PAIN (1999) (revised

May 2001), at http//:www.guideline.gov.html.
359.
AM. PAIN SOC'Y, GUIDELINE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF ACUTE AND CHRONIC PAIN
IN SICKLE CELL DISEASE (1999), at www.guideline.gov.
360.
WASH. STATE DEPT. OF LABOR & INDUS., GUIDELINES FOR OUTPATIENT
PRESCRIPTION OF ORAL OPIODS FOR INJURED WORKERS WITH CHRONIC, NONCANCER PAIN

(2000), at http//:www.guideline.gov/summary.
361.
The Management of PersistentPain in Older Persons, 50 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y
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Clinical practice guidelines potentially offer an authoritative and settled
statement of what the standard of care should be for the treatment of pain.36 3
Elder abuse/neglect provisions similar to California's Patient's Bill of
Rights, under which the suit against Dr. Chin was brought, combined with
medical guidelines outlining proper treatment of pain in sick and dying
patients, offer ways to impose responsibility for failures in pain and
symptom management. 6
While cases premised on the undertreatment of pain are likely to
continue, it is unlikely that these cases alone will be sufficient to diminish
physician reluctance to manage pain with controlled substances given the
factors that work in concert to impede pain management. Consequently, a
comprehensive solution that addresses each of the barriers to pain
management is needed to shift the environment to one that treats pain
adequately.
III. THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO PAIN MANAGEMENT
AND THE CONQUERING PAIN ACT OF 2003
There is a clear call for Congress to develop a comprehensive pain
management policy. Despite advances in technology, changes to state pain
policies, and the proliferation of practice guidelines for pain management,
the inadequate treatment of pain continues to be a significant problem in
this country. The problem is rooted in several causes: fear of disciplinary
action and criminal investigations; patient and provider attitudes; and
inadequate reimbursement, among others. To date, efforts to address this
problem have treated only one or two components of the problem.
These solutions, which are less than comprehensive, have failed to affect
an improvement in the management of pain. For example, while some state
legislatures have improved state laws and regulations (i.e, the creation of
IPTAs), inadequate pain management continues. Despite improvements in
reimbursement policies, pain management remains a problem. The key to

205, 205 (2002), availableat http://www.guideline.gov/summary.
362.

AM. MED. DIRS. Ass'N., CHRONIC PAIN MANAGEMENT IN THE LONG-TERM CARE

SETTING (1999), at htttp://www.guideline.gov/summary.
363. Furrow, supra note 317, at 32.
364. For instance, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania charged Alterra Assisted Living,
Inc. ("Alterra"), an assisted living facility, with three felony counts of neglect and one
misdemeanor count of neglect. See Hearing Transcript, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.
Alterra Assisted Living, Inc., CR-0000702-01(Centre County 2002) (preliminary hearing
testimony of the State's expert witness, Marie Boltz, R.N.). One felony count against
Alterra was based, in part, on allegations that it failed to provide adequate pain management
to one resident. Id. After a three-day preliminary hearing, all charges against Alterra were
dismissed. Id. (District Justice's order dated Jan. 31, 2002).
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affecting an improvement is a coordinated course of action that addresses
each component that contributes to the inadequate management of pain. A
comprehensive approach addressing each barrier to pain managementfederal and state laws; federal and state investigation and enforcement of
controlled substances laws; patient and physician attitudes; inadequate
education; and reimbursement policies-is needed.
A promising plan introduced in the 108th Congress, the Conquering Pain
Act of 2003 ("CPA"), is a significant attempt to address a number of the
barriers to pain management.3 65 Similar versions of the bill were introduced
in 1999 and 2001, but met an unceremonious demise, having been referred
to House and Senate committees and subcommittees but going no further.366
Though disappointing, in light of the myriad of political and financial issues
that have confronted Congress over the past four years, it is not surprising
that the CPA has not come to the forefront.36 7 However, inadequate pain
management continues to be a problem with more than fifty million
individuals currently suffer from chronic pain, resulting in a cost of $100
billion dollars to society in lost productivity and increased health care
costs. 36 8 The management of pain deserves Congress' attention now and
the CPA is a noteworthy effort to address the inadequate treatment of pain.
First and foremost, the CPA recognizes that untreated and undertreated
pain is a serious health problem in America. Congress has identified and
focused on the particular problem of undertreatment of pain and, in so
doing, has recognized not only the pain suffered by individual patients and
the burdens suffered by many providers but also the financial burdens
placed on society. 369 Through the Act, Congress also acknowledges that
providers are inadequately trained in pain management and that the
treatment of pain is suboptimal because the medical model focuses on a
cure rather than on symptom management. 370 Because all of these factors
have been identified as contributing to the undertreatment of pain, the CPA
is more comprehensive than past legislative efforts and addresses issues
including, education, attitudes, regulation, and reimbursement.
365. The Conquering Pain Act of 2003, S. 1278, H.R. 2507, 108th Cong. (2003).
366. The Conquering Pain Act of 1999, S. 941, H.R. 2188, 106th Cong. (1999); The
Conquering Pain Act of 2001, S. 1024, H.R. 2156, 107th Cong. (2001).
367. While other pressing issues have occupied Congress' time, it does not necessarily
follow that there is a lack of interest in these bills. To the contrary, Congress spent a good
deal of time over the last session evaluating one impediment to adequate pain
management-Medicare reimbursement policies of prescription drugs. This resulted in the
passage of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003.
See Pub. L. No. 108-173 (2003).
368. Glajchen, supra note 16, at 211-18.
369. S. 1278; H.R. 2507.
370. S. 1278 § 2(6)-(7) ; H.R. 2507 § 2(6)-(7).
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A. Title I

Under Title I, section 102, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(the "Secretary") is required, through the Agency for Health Research and
Quality ("AHRQ"), to ensure that health care facilities make available a
website established by AHRQ to all health care personnel providing care or
services at the health care facility. 371 The health care facilities would also
be required to ensure that the website is accessible to health care providers,
This provision specifically addresses the
patients, and families.37
inadequate education of those involved in pain management and will likely
improve the knowledge of pain management groups by ensuring that these
groups have access to practice guidelines.
Section 102 of Title I requires the administrators of several federal
government programs, i.e., Medicare, Medicaid, the Public Health Service,
and others, to inform beneficiaries that they should "expect to have their
pain assessed and should expect to be provided with effective pain and
symptom relief, when receiving benefits under such program. 3 73 While
this provision will create patient expectations of pain assessment and pain
relief, it falls short of requiring providers to provide pain relief for
beneficiaries of these programs.
Under section 103, the Secretary is required to provide funds for the
implementation of special education projects for providers, in as many
states as practicable, to improve the quality of pain and symptom
management.374 These projects would place "an emphasis on improving
pain and symptom management at the end of life," and could also include
efforts to increase the quality of services delivered to chronic pain patients
3 75
and the chronically ill for whom pain may be a significant symptom.
This provision has the potential to improve pain management by educating
providers about the management of pain.
Section 104 requires Medicare + Choice plans to provide information to
beneficiaries about the "organization's coverage of pain and symptom
371. S. 1278 tit. I, § 101(a) H.R. 2507 tit. I, § 101(a) ("Websites in existence... may be
The website at
used if such websites meet the requirements of this section.").
www.guideline.gov, which is organized and managed by the Agency on Health Care
Research, will likely meet the requirements of this section.
372. S. 1278 tit. I, § 101(c)(2)(A)-(C); H.R. 2507 tit. I, § 101(c)(2)(A)-(C).
373. S. 1278 tit. I, § 102(a); H.R. 2507 tit. I, § 102(a). Government health programs
include the Medicare and Medicaid program under Titles XVIII and XIX of the Social
Security Act, programs through the Public Health Service Act, the Indian Health Service, the
Federal Employee Benefits Program, the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), and other programs administered by Secretary of Health
and Human Services. See S. 1278 tit. I, § 102(b)(1)-(7); H.R. 2507 tit. I §, 102(b)(I)-(7).
374. S. 1278 tit. 1,§ 103; H.R. 2507 tit. I, § 103.
375. S. 1278 tit. I, § 103; H.R. 2507 tit. I, § 103.
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management" and to evaluate the plan's performance with respect to access
to, and quality of, pain and symptom management.37 6 Similar to section
102 of Title I, this provision creates patient expectations of pain assessment
and pain relief. However, it similarly falls short of providing a right to pain
relief for beneficiaries of these programs.
Under Section 105, the Surgeon General is required to prepare and
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report concerning the
state of pain and symptom management in the United States, which
includes a description of the legal and regulatory barriers to the treatment of
pain.377 This provision is important because it recognizes that multiple
barriers including inadequate education, patient differences, attitudes and
stringent laws and regulations, impede the management of pain. The report
by the Surgeon General makes the information available to both the
appropriate congressional committees and to the public and thus increases
awareness regarding pain management. 378 However, while the Surgeon
General's report may ultimately lead to specific actions to address barriers
to appropriate pain management, the provision, as written, falls short of
taking specific action to remove the barriers to the management of pain.
B. Title II
Title II awards grants for the establishment of six "National Family
Support Networks in Pain and Symptom Management" to serve as national
models for improving access and quality of pain and symptom
management. 379 The Networks cater to chronic pain patients and
individuals in need of pain management at the end of life and provide
assistance to family members and caregivers. Although the provision
attempts to improve patient access to pain management and patientphysician communication by establishing six networks, it fails to address
physician fears of regulatory scrutiny. Consequently, even if patient access
and communication is improved, the physician's fear of investigations and
sanctions for overprescribing pain medication will perpetuate the
inadequate treatment of pain.
C. Title III
Section 301 of Title III of the CPA requires MedPac to conduct a study
and submit a report to appropriate congressional committees concerning the
376. S. 1278 tit. I, § 104(a)(1), (2)(C); H.R. 2507 tit. I, § 104(a)(1), (2)(C).
377. S. 1278 tit. I, § 105(1); H.R. 2507 tit. I, § 105(1).
378. S. 1278 tit. 1, § 105; H.R. 2507 tit. I, § 105.
379. S. 1278 tit. 11, § 201(a); H.R. 2507 tit. II, § 201(a). Congress would allocate $18
million toward this effort. See S. 1278 tit. II, § 201(e); H.R. 2507 tit. II, § 201(e).
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reimbursement barriers to pain management. 380 Section 302 of Title III
would require the General Accounting Office to conduct a survey of public
and private health insurance providers, including managed care entities, to
determine whether reimbursement policies of these insurers inhibits access
to pain and symptom management of chronic pain patients.38' Sections 301
and 302 recognize that reimbursement and insurance policies present
barriers to the management of pain. However, the provisions fall short of
taking specific action to improve known reimbursement barriers to the
management of pain, such as the prescription drug benefit or the hospice
eligibility requirement.
D. Title IV
Section 401 of Title IV requires the Secretary to establish an advisory
committee to make recommendations to the Secretary concerning a
coordinated federal agenda on pain and symptom management.382 The
advisory committee must prepare and submit recommendations concerning
the need for a federal agenda on pain and symptom management to the
Secretary. The committee will also report on ways to better coordinate the
activities of entities within the Department of Health and Human Services
and other federal entities charged with responsibility for the delivery of
health care services and research on pain and symptom management.383
Under section 402, the Secretary, with the assistance of the Institute of
Medicine, will be required to review research regarding legal and regulatory
384
barriers that impact patient access to pain and symptom management.
Title IV enhances pain management for several reasons. First, it
recognizes that various barriers, including federal and state legal and
regulatory policies, exist to impede the management of pain. Second, Title
IV implies that the medical use of opioids is appropriate and a legitimate
professional practice. Third, Title IV recognizes that a comprehensive
policy and a coordinated effort is necessary to improve the management of
pain. However, while Title IV may ultimately lead to specific actions to
address barriers to pain management, the provision, like the other
provisions, falls short of taking specific action to remove the barriers to the
management of pain or to address the adverse impact that federal and state
enforcement of controlled substance laws has on the management of pain.

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

S.
S.
S.
S.
S.

1278
1278
1278
1278
1278

tit. III, § 301(1); H.R. 2507 tit. III, § 301(1).
tit. III, § 302(a); H.R. 2507 tit. III, § 302(a).
tit. IV, § 401(a); H.R. 2507 tit. IV, § 401(a).
tit. IV, § 401(e); H.R. 2507 tit. IV, § 401(e).
tit. IV, § 402(a)(3); H.R. 2507 tit. IV, § 402(a)(3).
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E. Title V
Under Title V, the Secretary, acting through the Health Resources and
Services Administration awards grants for the establishment of five or more
demonstration projects to determine effective methods to measure
improvement in the skills, knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs of health care
personnel in pain and symptom management. Additionally, five or more
demonstration projects that implement care models for individuals at the
end of life are authorized under the provision. This provision, like Title I
section 102, specifically addresses the inadequate education of health care
providers, patients, and families regarding the management of pain and
assists educators in determining how best to educate providers. However,
while Title V may lead to specific actions to educate providers about pain
management, this provision, as written, does not advance specific action to
address the inadequate education of providers.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Conquering Pain Act of 2003 is an admirable effort by Congress to
address the inadequate management of pain.
It raises the public's
awareness of this issue and recognizes that multiple barriers impede pain
management. Additionally, the CPA acknowledges that a coordinated and
comprehensive effort is required to adequately address the management of
pain. As such, it devotes valuable federal resources, namely time and
funds, to further research this issue. However, despite its attempts, the Act
does not go far enough to attack the problem because it fails to adequately
address several significant issues that are known to impede the management
of pain.
A. Investigations and Enforcement
Adding a provision that addresses the barriers created by government
investigations and the enforcement of controlled substance laws would
strengthen the CPA. The proposed law does not contain any provisions that
address this issue, even though the fear of regulatory scrutiny is a primary
barrier to pain management. Health care providers are reluctant to relieve
the pain of their patients even if they know it might be the best course of
action. The reticence on the part of providers is understandable given the
severity of the potential penalties: loss or revocation of license, fines, jail
time, and loss of liberty. The CPA should support the notion that effective
pain management can be achieved and that those who provide appropriate
pain management have little to fear from the law.
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The Act could achieve this goal in two ways. 385 First, the CPA should
be amended to provide a "safe harbor," like those found in the state
Intractable Pain Treatment Acts that immunize health care providers and
health care institutions that prescribe, dispense, or administer controlled
substances for the purpose of relieving pain when the provider or institution
demonstrates compliance with an established practice guideline.
Compliance with an applicable practice guideline for pain management
would provide a defense in an administrative, civil, or criminal action under
the CSA.
Second, the CPA should also be amended to address the problems with
federal investigations and enforcement actions. Generally speaking, federal
and particularly state investigations and enforcement actions for
overprescribing pain medications are triggered by the quantity of drug
prescribed to a patient, rather than a qualitative review of the patient's
condition, the length of the drug therapy, and the patient's response to drug
therapy. For this reason, the CPA should require the DEA and states to
follow specific guidelines for investigations and enforcement of controlled
substance laws. These guidelines should be determined with input from
investigators and health care providers who prescribe controlled substances
to manage pain. For example, neither federal nor state investigations
should be triggered solely by the quantity of drug prescribed. Both federal
and state investigators should be trained in the appropriate use of controlled
Further, investigators should be required to have both
substances.
quantifiable and qualifiable information and documentation prior to
bringing charges against any health care provider or institution for
overprescribing controlled substances, and should be required to review
patient medical records. This would create a presumption that the provider
is acting in the best interest of the patient, which is consistent with the goal
of managing pain. Investigators should also be required to consult with an
expert in pain management to evaluate the patient's medical records. On
the other side, providers and institutions should ensure that they have
diligently and sufficiently documented their assessments, telephone
conversations with patients, and the medical necessity of prescriptions for
narcotics. Adequate documentation should be utilized to refute charges of
overprescribing narcotics and to demonstrate compliance with the standard
of care established by practice guidelines.
B. Health Care FacilityInspection Requirements
The CPA should be amended to require that health care institutions that

385.

Frank-Stromborg & Christensen, supra note 201, at 236.
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participate in federal government health care programs assess and
adequately provide pain relief for beneficiaries of those federal programs.
While the CPA, as written, would create patient expectations of pain
assessment and pain relief, it falls short of requiring health care facilities to
provide pain relief for beneficiaries of these programs. The CPA should
provide civil money penalties and other punishments for health care
facilities who fail to comply with this requirement. The providers who
demonstrate compliance with an established practice guideline for the
management of pain necessarily would demonstrate compliance with the
requirement.
C. Reimbursement
The CPA should be amended to address four well-documented
reimbursement barriers to pain management.386
First, Congress should amend the hospice provision in the Medicare Act
to eliminate the requirement that a physician certify that an individual has
six months or less to live. Instead, the Act should require that physicians
certify terminal illness by another standard to be determined by Centers of
Medicare and Medicaid Services with input from physicians and other
health care providers. The difficulty of predicting the course of illness or
time of death makes the physician certification of terminal illness
requirement unworkable. Consequently, hospice admissions are often
delayed, and patients are not receiving the full hospice benefit (i.e., six
months) that Congress intended them to receive.
Second, Congress should provide a safe harbor from federal and state
fraud investigations for health care providers and institutions who have, in
good faith, certified Medicare beneficiaries for hospice services. Congress
should expressly require that OIG audits of hospice care eligibility
determinations are performed by physicians who specialize in patients with
terminal illness.
Physicians' concerns about investigations of their
certifications of terminal illness for hospice services delay admissions of
Medicare beneficiaries to hospice care and impede pain management.
Third, Congress should require that the Centers for Medicare and
Medicare Services evaluate Medicare payment rates for hospice services in
light of MedPac's recommendations, and report to Congress with the results
of the evaluation on specific date. Currently, hospice rates are based on
information obtained from the early 1980's, which is outdated and thus
inconsistent with the costs that efficient hospices incur in furnishing care to
386.

The absence of a prescription drug benefit was formerly a reimbursement barrier,

but Congress has recently addressed this issue with the passage of the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003. See Pub. L. No. 108-173 (2003).
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patients.
Fourth, Congress should include a provision in the CPA amending the
Medicaid statute to prohibit states from placing limitations on the quantity
of prescription drugs dispensed to Medicaid beneficiaries. As previously
discussed, coverage limitations on the quantity of prescription drugs
impedes pain management.
D. Education
While the CPA contains provisions that would improve the education of
patient, families, and providers, it should go further to combat the problem
of inadequate pain management. For example, the CPA should be amended
to make the receipt of federal money by professional schools and
universities contingent upon compliance with a requirement that schools
incorporate pain management and the use of controlled substances into their
curricula. This would ensure that future health care professionals attending
federally funded schools are, at the very least, exposed to pain management
earlier in their careers. Moreover, Congress should allocate funds to
provide grants to academic institutions and professional schools to provide
Further, Congress should make DEA
pain management education.
registration to prescribe controlled substances contingent upon continuing
medical education on the use of controlled substances to manage pain.
The CPA and the proposed revisions, taken together, represent a
comprehensive policy addressing the multiple components that impede the
management of pain. Given the fifty million patients who exhibit pain in
America and the exorbitant costs related to untreated pain, Congress should
reintroduce the CPA with the proposed revisions.
V. CONCLUSION

Despite progress in the medical community's understanding of how to
treat pain, health care providers continue to underprescribe opioids to
manage pain. This practice is a result of several factors, including fear of
disciplinary and enforcement actions; negative attitudes of health care
providers, patients, and the public about the use of controlled substances to
treat pain; inadequate education in pain management; and Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursement policies. Recent decisions holding physicians
accountable for the inadequate treatment of pain are insufficient to change
the reluctance of health care providers to prescribe controlled substances to
manage pain. Until this point, efforts to improve the pain management
problem have been piecemeal and have consequently failed to achieve an
improvement in the management of pain.
A comprehensive public policy that addresses the multiple barriers is
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needed to address the inadequate management of pain in America. While
the Conquering Pain Act of 2003 is a commendable effort to improve pain
management, it fails to adequately address several significant issues that are
known to impede the management of pain. Congress should pass the CPA
in accordance with the proposed revisions in this congressional session.
Only then will it be possible for the millions of patients who suffer in pain
to obtain adequate pain management. Society will benefit from a policy
that adequately addresses pain management through decreased health care
spending and disability and worker's compensation costs, and increased
productivity. It is for these reasons that there is a need for Congress to
develop and implement a comprehensive policy such as the CPA with the
proposed revisions to put an end to the epidemic of pain that currently
exists in this country.
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